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referreri  the  following  motions  for  resolutions  to  the Political Affairs  Committee; 
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tabled by  Mr  van  AERSSEN  and  others  on  the stabilization and  extension of 
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tabled  by  Mr  KYRKOS  on  the  oecision taken by  the  Israeli  Knesset 
to  annex  the  Golan  Heights; 
-at its sitting of  18.12.1981,  the motion  for  a  resolution  <Doc.  1-902/81 
tabled  by  Mr  EPHREMIDIS  and  others on  the  annexation of  the Golan  Heights 
by  Israel; 
-at its sitting of  18.12.1981,  the motion  for  a  resolution  (Doc.  1-906/81) 
tabled  by  Mr  SEGRE  and  Mr  CARDIA  on  the  annexation  of  the  Golan  Heights  by 
the  State of  Israel; 
-at its sitting of  15.2.1982,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  (Doc.  1-956/81) 
tabled by  Mr  MARSHALL  and  others  on  the  Israeli  annexation of  the Golan; 
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tabled by  Mr  KYRKOS  on  the occupied  Arab  territories on  the West  Bank  and 
in  the  Gaza  Strip; 
- at  its sitting of  14.6.1982,  the motion  for  a  resolution  (Doc.  1-333/82> 
tabled by  Mr  ROMUALDI  and  others  on  the Israeli  invasion of  Southern Lebanon,  and 
at  its sitting of  9  July  1982,  the motion  for  a  resolution  (Doc.  1-59/82) 
tabled  by  Mr  GLINNE  and  others  on  the  imposition of  martial  Law  in the 
territories occupied  by  Israel. 
At  its meeting  of  29  I  30  May  1980,  the Political Affairs  Committee 
decided  to draw  up  a  report  on  the  matter. 
At  its meeting  of  8  July  1980  it appointed  Mr  PENDERS  rapporteur. 
It  considered  the  draft  report  at  its meetings  of  27  ·./  28  October 
1981,  24  1  26  February  1982,  22  I  24  March  1982,  23  I  25  June  1982,  and 
19  I  20  October  1982.  At  the  latter meeting·  ~he motion  for  a  r~solution 
as  a  whole  was  adopted  by  28  votes  to  5  with  2  abstentions. 
The  following  took  part  in  the  vote:  Mr  Rumor,  chairman;  Mr  Haagerup, 
1st  vice-chairman;  Mr  Fergusson,  3rd  vice-chairman;  Mr  Penders,  rapporteur; 
Mr  Barbi,  Mr  Berkhouwer,  Lord  Bethell,  Mr  Beyer  de  Ryke  (deputizing  for  Mr 
Donnez),  Mr  Bournias,  Mr  Capanna(deputizing  for  Mrs  Hammerich),  Mr  Cariglia, 
Mrs  Charzat  (deputizing  for  Mr  Motchane),  Mr  Croux  <deputizing  for  Mrs  Lenz), 
Mr  Denis  <deputizing  for  Mr  Marchais),  Mr  B.  Friedrich,  Mrs  Gaiotti  de  Biase 
<deputizing  for  Mr  Antoniozzi),  Mr  Gawronski  (deputizing  for  Mr  Bettiza), 
Mr  Habsburg,  Mr  Hansch,  Mr  von  Hassel,  Mr  Israel  (deputizing  for  Mr  de  La 
Malene),  Mr  Jaquet,  Mr  Katzer  <deputizing  for  Mr  Diligent),  Mr  Klepsch,  Mr 
Kyrkos  (deputizing  for  Mr  Pajetta),  Mr  Lomas,  Mr  Van  Minnen  (deputizing  for 
Mrs  Van  den  Heuvel),  Mr  Mommersteeg  (deputizing  for  Mr  Deschamps),  Mr  Moorhouse 
(deputizing  for  Sir  James  Scott-Hopkins),  Lord  O'Hagan,  Mr  Prag  (deputizing 
for  Lady  Elles),  Mr  Romualdi,  Mr  Schall,  Mr  Schieler,  Mr  Segre  and  Mr  Walter 
<deputizing  for  Mr  Zagari). 
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The  Political  Affairs  Committee  hereby  submits  to  the  Europel 
the  following  Motion  for  a  Resolution,  together  with  explanatory 
on  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East 
A.  desiring a  comprehensive,  just  and  lasting peace  settlement 
Middle  East, 
B.  desiring  a  solution to  the  problems  of  the Lebanon  that will' 
the  independence,  sovereignty  and  integrity of  that  country  a 
security  and  further  development  of  the different  peoples  liv 
C.  having  regard  to  Resolutions  Nos.  242  and  338  of  the  United  N 
Security  Council, 
D.  recalling  its  resolution  of  11  October  1978  on  the  result  of 
conference  at  Camp  David  and  its  resolution of  26  April  1979 
signing  of  the  peace  treaty between  Egypt  and  Israel  and  the 
bution  of  the  Community  to  a  comprehensive  peace  settlement1, 
E.  having  regard  to  the  statement  on  the Middle  East  by  the  Euro 
Council  on  13  June  1980  in  Venice, 
F.  welcoming  the  participation of  four  EEC  Member  States  in  the 
I 
multinational  peace-keeping  force  and  the  participation of  t~ 
States  in  the  international  peace-keeping  force  in Lebanon, 
G.  noting  the  Fahd  Plan,  made  public  for  the  first  time  on  7  Aug 
H.  recalling  its  resolutions  of  12  October  1978,  10  April  1981, 
1982,  17  June  1982,  16  September  1982  and  15  October  1982,  on 
2  Lebanon  , 
------------------- 1  OJ  No.  c 261,  6.11.1978 
OJ  No.  c 127,  21 • 5.1979,  p.  59 
2  OJ  No.  c 261,  6.11.1978,  p.  38 
OJ  No.  c 1  01,  4.5.1981,  p.  112 
OJ  No.  c 125,  17.5.1982,  p.  79 
OJ  No.  c 182,  19.7.1982,  p.  52 
OJ  No.  c 267,  11 . 10.1982 
OJ  No. 
- 5  - PE I.  having  regard  to various  statements  on  Lebanon  by  the  European  Council 
and  the  Foreign  Affairs Ministers  meeting  in  political cooperation, 
J.  taking  the  view  that  the  de  facto  annexation  by  Israel  of  East  Jerusalem 
and  the  Golan  Heights,  the  settlement  policy  pursued  in  the  Gaza  Strip 
and  on  the  West  Bank  and  the policy of  dismissing  elected mayors  in  the 
West  Bank  are  not  compatible  with  progress  towards  a  comprehensive  peace 
settlement, 
K.  beLieving  that  recent  events  in  the area,  such  as  the  Israeli  invasion of 
Lebanon,  the  Israeli  siege of  West  Beirut  and  the  war  between  Iraq  and 
[ran  have  made  the  need  for  a  political  solution of  the Arab-Israeli 
conflict  even  more  urgent, 
L.  deploring  the  assassination of  President  Beshir  Gemayel,  President  of 
the  Lebanese  Republic,  the  subsequent  entry  of  Israeli  forces  into West  Beirut, 
and  the  massacres  in  the  Palestinian  camps  in  September  1982, 
M.  having  regard  to  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mrs  Charzat  and 
others  on  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East,  the motion  for  a  resolution 
tabled  by  Mr  Lalor  on  the  situation  in  Southern  Lebanon,  the  motion  for 
a  resolution  tabled by  Mr  Fanti  and  others  on  the  expulsion  of  Palestinian 
mayors,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  d'Ormesson  and  others  on 
Lebanon,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  van  Aerssen  and 
Mr  Blumenfeld  on  the  stabilization and  extension  of  peace  efforts  in  the 
Middle  East,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  Kyrkos  on  the 
decision  taken  by  the  Israeli  Knesset  to  annex  the  Golan  Heights,  the 
m0tion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  Ephremidis  and  others on  the 
annexation  of  the  Golan  Heights  by  Israel,  the  motion  for  a  resolution 
:abled  by  Mr  Segre  and  Mr  Cardia  on  the  annexation  of  the  Golan  Heights 
by  the  State of  Israel,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  Marshall 
and  others  on  the  Israeli  annexation  of  the  Golans,  the motion  for  a 
resolution  tabled  by  Mr  Kyrkos  on  the  occupied  Arab  territories on  the 
West  Bank  and  in  the  Gaza  Strip,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by 
Mr  Romualdi  and  others  on  the  Israeli  invasion  of  Southern  Lebanon,  and 
the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  Glinne  and  others  on  the  im-
position of  martial  law  in  the  territories occupied  by  Israel; 
N.  having  regard  to  the  report  of  the Political  Affairs  Committee, 
CDoc.  1-786/82), 
- 6  - PE  73.166/fin. 1.  Is  convinced  that  Resolution5  242  and  338  of  the United  Nations  Security 
Council  constitute a  good  and  workable  framework  for  a  comprehensive 
peace  settlement  in  the Middle  East; 
2.  Is  convinced  that  the  Camp  David  agreements  can  and  must  be  a  sound 
basis on  which  to build a  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict; 
3.  Notes,  however,  that  a  new  initiative will  be  necessary  if the 
negotiations  on  autonomy  in  the  Camp  David  context  fail; 
4.  Considers  the  Venice  Declaration as  a  useful  contribution towards 
such  a  settlement; 
5.  Is  of  the  opinion  that  any  European  initiative should  follow  in the 
footsteps  of  Camp  David,  and  should  therefore  be  coordinated with 
the  United  States; 
6.  Appreciates  the  proposals  made  on  1st  September  1982  by  President 
Reagan  as  a  means  of  giving  a  new  impetus  to  the  Camp  David  process; 
7.  Urges  the  European  Council  and  the  Foreign  Ministers  meeting  in 
political  cooperation  to start  from  the  following  principles: 
7.1.  the  use  of  force  and  annexation  is unacceptable as  a  means  of 
gaining  control  of  territory, 
7.2.  Israel must  end  the  occupation  of  territories held  since 1967, 
7.3.  the  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and  independence  of  every 
State  in  the  region, including Israel,  must  be  upheld  together 
with  their  right  to  live  in  peace  within  secure and  recognized 
boundaries, 
7.4.  self-determination  for  the Palestinian people  to be  implemented 
by  a  procedure  compatible  with  the  right  of  Israel  to existence 
and  security  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  peace  settlement, 
including  the  option  of  a  possible Palestinian State; 
8.  Takes  the  view  that  the  Fahd  Plan  in  the  form  adopted  by  the  Arab 
Summit  at  Fez  in  SeP,tember  1982  contains  usable  elements; 
9.  Considers  that  the  Palestinians  themselves  should  decide  by  whom  they 
are  to  be  represented,  and  that  the  PLO  can  only  be  accepted as  a 
legitimate participant  in  the  negotiations  when  all paragraphs  of 
its  charter  calling explicitly or  implicitly  for  the destruction of 
Israel  are  formally  deleted; 
- 7  - PE  73.166/fin. 10.  Considers  it essential  for  Israel  and  the Palestinian people,  including 
the  PLO,  to  hold  talks  with  each  other  and  to  initiate a  process  leading 
to  mutual  acceptance  and  recognition; 
11.  Urges  the  European  Council  and  the  Foreign Ministers  meeting  in  politica~ 
cooperation  to  consult  with  the  United  States on  Lebanon  with  a  view 
to  securing: 
(a)  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  troops; 
(b)  the  stationing  in  Beirut  and  other  parts of  the  country  of  an 
international  peace  force  in  which  the  EEC  Member  States  would 
participate,  preferably  to  replace  UNIFIL; 
(c)  the  disbanding  of  the militias; 
(d)  the  reestablishment  of  an  effective Lebanese  police force  and 
Lebanese  armed  forces; 
(e)  the  rebuilding  of  the  Lebanese  State  and  Lebanese  society  in  a 
manner  that  does  justice to all  sections  of  the  population; 
12.  Takes  the  view  that  any  contribution  from  the  European  Community  and 
its Member  States  to  a  comprehensive  settlement  must  include  the 
following: 
12.1.  an  offer  to  make  Member  State  contingents  available  to  a  peace-
keeping  force~ possibly  under  UN  auspicesr  to  ensure  observance 
of  military  and  security  provisions; 
12.2.  offers  of  economic,  financial  and  technical  aid  to all  States  in  the 
area  and  to  the  Palestinian  people  as  participants  in  the  settlement; 
13.  Considers  thatp  in  the  meantime,  the  European  Community  and  its Member 
States  must  continue  supplying  humanitarian  aid,  particularly  to 
Lebanon; 
14.  Takes  the  view  that  the  authority of  any  comprehensive  peace  settlement 
will  ultimately  depend  on  a  UN  Security  Council  follow-up  resolution 
to  Resolution  242,  making  explicit  reference  to  the  State of  Israel 
and  to  the  right  to  self-determination of  the  Palestinian people; 
- 8  - PE  73.16~ 15.  Instructs its President  to  forward  this  resolution  to  the  Commission;-
Council  and  foreign  ministers meeting  in political  cooperation,  to 
the  parliaments of  the  Member  States of  the  Community  and  to the 
Secretary-General  of  the United  Nations  Organization. 
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EXPI.J\NATORY  STA'I'EMENT 
PART  I:  THE  MIDDLE  EA..ST  ·-·-···.  ···- ... ·--·- . ----··· 
1.  The  strategic location of the  Mid<llr~ •;,,,t and the resources its countries 
possess mean  that events in the area directly affect nations everywhere.  It is 
possible to discern two  hasic pedods  in thP  recent  hi story of the .1JT'J  which 
lllilY  nLJW  serve  lo Ltx.:us  thi  t>  n.![JOrl. 
2.  These are:-
(1)  A semi-colonialist period,  considerably influenced by Britain 
and France,  lasting until the early 1960s,  dominated by the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
(2)  Since the Suez crisis and the early 1960~ the emergence  of 
the Middle  East as an area of Soviet-American tensions,  and 
the dominance of the Palestine question  in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
3.  A thir·d and  im)..>Ortant  situation became  increasingly evident  in the early 
1970s:  namely  the dependence of the  industrialized nations of Western  Europe, 
Japan,  the United States,  and  possibly in the future,  of the Soviet Union,  upon 
the energy resources of the oil-producing countries of the Middle  East. 
4.  Finally,  in view of the traditional tics and  conmon  interests on  a  religious 
and cultural  level  which  so obviqusly also link Europe  to the Middle  East,  it is 
becoming  incr2asingly clear that the European  Communities  now  have a  role to play 
in helping to bring about a  just peace and stable conditions in the area.  This  role 
must  be  perrormed  by  the  European  Community  in consort with  the  United 
States. 
l.  The_  .~r,a!:?_-_I_s,r_a_elJ:.  _C_?.n_f_l_i~_t_ .B!:l.~  _t_h~- _qu_e_s_t_i.<:?_n_  9..~  P.<OI.l_e_:s_t_i_n_e_ 
5.  Any  true understanding of the present situation in the Middle  East must 
take  into account  the  long history of nationalism and  international involvement 
in this troubled area.  It is clear that enormous  barriers of historical,  religious 
and cultural antagonisms,  nationalism and  suspicion have  to be overcome if peace 
is to be brought  to the Middle  East. 
6.  Tlle  Balfour Dccl a.rution of  1917,  supporting  the creation of a  Jewish  Home  in 
Palestine,  for  exan~Jle,  follow"d  in  l'J22  hy  the Dritish Mand.:Jte  over Palestine, 
r.•nsurcd  thilt  control of  t.h(•  region  f0.ll  to the Drit ish Governn-cnt  after mor·c  than 
four  hundred years of rule by  the Ottoman  '1\.trks.  In 1947  the General  Assembly 
of  the  United Nations  recommended  a  division  of  Palestine  into Jewish  and 
Arab  sectors  which  would  work  together  in  economic  cooperation,  while 
Jerusalem  was  to  receive  international status.  Israel  accepted  the 
-10- PE  73.166/fin. proposed divlsio!l,  t.nr;  J'_,_,·_s  <·ejected it,  and this plan,  together with 
the  declaration  of:·  i<"odP<>enr>nce  by Israel,  marked the beginning of  a 
period in  tt:.:  history  0;'  t ''e  ~Fddle East which was  t.o  be  dominated  by 
the  Arab-Israe:ti  confl>ct,  a  conflict  which  four  wars  were  unable to 
resolve.  It gradually  b~came r:l ear  - particularly after the  1967  •11ar  -
that  the  Palestiniar.  factor  war,  assuming  an  increasingly significant 
and  independen'"  ctim<·ns 1cr.  Following the  1973 war,  renewed attempts 
were  made  to  ach;<>v<>  ,,  set:tle>~ent through the United Nations.  However, 
nothing  caw: of  the  Gene·., J  Conference.  In the ensuing period the 
United States  initi.uted moves  to secure bilateral agreements  in the 
Hiddle  Ea~t,  and  1t  was  largely thanks  to the efforts of  Dr  Kissinger 
that  di.sengagenent  a:jreements  were  concluded between  Egypt,  Israel and 
Syria. 
7.  A ,  .  .,l  •. li~Jlc  b!'C''lk~hn:-u•Jr  in il  ~olution to lhe Arab-l;;raell conflict,  hCM'Cver, 
was  to ccmn  follc,ing the vis;t of the Egyptian President,  Mr  Anwar el Sadat  to 
Jerusalet;l  .in  Noven>ter  197'1.  !-lis  speech to the Knesset paved the way  for a 
rec:'cprocal visit by the  Is:-ae  ~;  Piin'P- Minister,  Mr  Begin,  to Isrnailia and the historic 
suronit  .. :cn:ere>ncP betwcol t.he  L"'=>  l._.dcers and United States President Carter at 
Ca'l"i>  Oc1vi.:!  ~n S·=-pt.£:5.-..Gs:r- ]978.  ~tr.orf?,  they agreed on a  ·"frCU\'IC!1IrK>rk  for peace in the 
M.· .. :icUe  I:::ast."  Pnd  prf'Y._~lcn~red  l heiY  . 1.nte~tion to reach a  "just, ccmprehensive and 
dlrr.a..b1<:!  sP.~.:'_:_l,_;.'Tt:>r;.t 11  t.hrr<;.:qh  :\-:~7'  con<::lusion of peace treaties based on Resolutions 
242  and  3JR  of  the UPl tcci  tla.cians  Seccrity Council.  (See Annex 1.) 
E-.  7hc  c;;;rr~p  ')iFi.d Agr<"er•c:ts  pmvided for the conClusion of the Egyptian-
lscacll  f'ea.cc  T;·caty of  21;  t'iarch  ::_979  and should be seen as the first important 
~.bo-·p  in tn<"  .-Jir8ction of a  .comprehensive and peaceful settlen-ent of the Middle 
East  cor,~1icL. 
C'arnp  ~)avid  Main  Pcinls o-i:  t.~·(-~  Se~.t:.lement 
~-------·- --·-·  . -------------
-Peace- a  ces.£.atii)J!  of  hcr:-::i.l.J..ties; 
- 1--iitlvi,_awal- an er.d  1:o  Tocaeli o".il.itary occupation of the  l~est Bank  and the 
Caza  Stri.~; 
- ~iecuci.ty  - f:or- all  1J-:".T.T 1"-'~  HlVOll.'f::d; 
- [J....\.ltonc::nly  for  t:i1c:  Pa1t::::~t1~'~a.n  t_)eoplc. 
( i  l  \'lest  Ba~l',  and G""'' 
10.  'Il"too  pruposills  C'CElii•<"rl  a  precess of change which President Carter saw as in 
kePt?.J..nq  with Arub  ..:md  Pale:_,~- :..nl~.n  hor....es,  while also respJCting Israel's vital 
secur-ity  lnterP.st:.s.  ::nh:L-lt;u1ts of  the h'est Bank  and Gaza Strip were to be given 
the r.lght  lo f!J.ll  adminis:x.'l~~''e autor.omy  for a  transitional period of five years, 
nlthouCJil  t!~e  final status of Uiesc  zones was  to be the subject of negotiations 
dur:l.nq  th-:c-.  t.rar:c,it',•_;r.al  p"riO<i between  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan and the Palestinian 
representative<: of these  al"cas.  A  major  problem is that the wording of the  framework 
covers several  concPptinn~; of aut-::mcmy. 
1  See  Annex  5  PE  73.166 /fin. 
-- 11  -11.  The  tigreemcnt><  <:11n~"l  to provide  lor  t ilc  security or  Jll the parties 
involved - including  Israel - so that none  need fear attack or military threats 
fran any other. 
During the transitional period,  Israel was,  therefore,  to continue to man 
sverified garrisons,  while cl.anestic  se•:urity was  to be ensured by a  local police 
furcc. 
A variety of security arrai1gements  v1ere  outlined to reinforce peace between 
Israel and its neighbours. 
(iii)  Autonomy  for  the_Palestinian  Peopl~ 
12.  Camp  David also provided that Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan and representatives 
of the Palestinian people should take part  in negotiations to solve all aspects of 
the Palestinian problem and that any solution to emerge fran negotiations must 
recognise the  'legitimate rights and  just requirements'  of the Palest.inian people. 
U.  The  Agreemconts  signed at  Camp  Da.vid  also provided the  frarrework  for the 
conclusion of a  peiicc  treaty bet;,-een  Egypt  and  Israel.  The Treaty reaffinned the 
signatories'  adherence  t.c•  the Camp  David Accords.  It provided also for:-
- e1n  end  to the  st.a~c·  oE  war; 
- the  retut·n  to ECJY!•l  of  th<'  Sinai  Pcnin:-ou1a  cafJttJred by  Israel  in 1967; 
- the  recognition by  Eqypt  of  the  stC~te of  Isrc~cl,  providing thereby for the 
establ ishmcnt of  'nom1al  and  friend) y'  relations through the exchange of 
cl'JUJiiS>'iKlor:..;  and  the·  qK'I1lllCJ  of cllltural  and  trade channels between the 
tr.:  .. 'n  sides. 
14.  President Carter's  initiative to bring peace to the t1iddle East and the 
conclusion of  the Peace Treaty  •.vas  considered at the time to be of great historical 
i.mportance.  It was  hoped that  the  Agreements  <:md  the Treaty would accelerate the 
movement  tov1ards  a  ne11  era of  reconciliat.ir)n  in  the  ~l{ddle East.  The Goverrunent.s 
of the  (then)  Nine  OX:  ~1cmbcr Slilles,  f<•c  cxa"~'lc,  endorsed the Carter initiative 
and  ex1.xesscd  thE"ir  hope  that  the our.cumc  uf CmiJl  David would be  a  major step on the 
road  to a  lastinq  pE'ace. 
15.  In  l\pr il  197'J  il  re,;oluLion o[  the  l·:urq.Jc,m  Parliament on  the signing of the 
1  Peace  Tt·eaty  betwl!en  I':CJ\1•\.  a11d  Isr.10l  v1annly  vx'lccmcd the conclusion of the Tt·caty. 
It urqcJ that the  Nine  c;!J<-,II]d  do all  in  thr·ir  pnvlt'J.- to intensify the exsisting links 
l:>etl,ecn  the Cr:mnurnty,  FCJY!Jt  and  Is<·ael  and cmpho.Jsised  the desire of  the European 
Parliil.fTlCnt  to seek  tu  rrc;k•·  Cin  t>ffcr:tive  cor11 ril,utinn  to the Ccmnunity's efforts to 
assist  in the  achievement  of  d  COI1~Jrehcw'i  vr~  '".c.·t-tlcm ·nt. 
1  C\J  C  127/59  , ,c  21. 'i. J 979  (Doc.  82/7'J) 
12  - PE  73 .l6&'fin 16.  However,  hopes that the peace settlement contained the seeds of a  secure 
and peaceful future proved premature.  It is increasingly recognised that the 
Camp  David Agreements,  important as  they are  and should remain,  cannot be  seen as 
constituting a  sufficient basis for  a  comprehensive agreement.  Briefly,  a  number of 
events have served to compromise  the chances of achieving  a  just and lasting peace. 
17.  One  of  the most  si.ynifiL:unt of these events was the rejection of the 
Agreements  by other Arab States and by the PLO,  who  refused to accept Agreements  \~ith 
whose  negotiation they had not been associated.  It was believed that the Agreements 
could not contribute to any  final  and positive solution,  and President Sadat's 
indication of his readiness to negotiate with the enemy,  Israel,  was  considered a 
rortal sin,  which  led to the  inmediate economic  and political boycott of Egypt by 
the other Arab  States.  It is clear that the success of any  future peace moves, 
therefore,  rests on the promotion of broader based contacts than those of Camp  David 
to include representatives  from all the countries and parties  involved in the 
Palestinian dispute,  including the PLO. 
18.  '!'he  main  failure of the Camp  David Agreerrcnt  lies in the inability or 
unwillingness of Israel to grant  any meaningful  autonomy to the PcJlest i 'lian'·'  ,y,  ~:h,-c 
viest  Bank  or in the Gaza  strip.  So  far,  it has  not  even  been  possible  to 
find  Palestinians prepared  to  take  part  in  negotiations  on  autonomy,  not 
least  because  many  Palestinians  fear  that participation would  put  their 
lives  in  jeopardy.  The  Israeli Government's policy of rapidly 
founding  new  setllef11'2nts  und ex[->.mding  Lhose  that already c;(ist on  the \·:est  Bank 
is incompatible with the spirit of Camp  David.  It also means  that the prospect of 
self-determination  for  the l'ule:<t.ini;m:;  is IJ<Y<>ITling  increc~~ingly remote.  The  further·  Israel~ acticn 
in March  1982  of  deposing  the  Arab  mayors  of  El-Bireh,  Nablus  and  Ramallah,  on  the 
grounds  of  their  pro-PLO  sympathies,  was  the  signal  for  serious  disor~ers  in  th~ 
West  Bank,  which  cost  several  lives. 
(iii)  Jerusalem 
19.  Fol lc11nng  the Cump  David  ,\gn:-crrcnts,  in Murdl  1979  Prin'<'  Minister  fYc:CJin  al!:oo 
stressed Lhe  Israeli Vle''' of  the status of Jerusalem ·as the indivisible czepital of 
Israel.  In .July  1980  the  Israeli  :<nesset  adopted a  law on  the annexa.ticr. of Ea='t 
Jerusalem  - technically part of  the \lest  Bank  - proclaiming it the capital of 
Israel.  The Arab 1-lorld,  Egypt  included,  condemned this move.  In  the fl\Hlx P~aJ:, 
Jerusalern is mentioned as the capital of the Palestinian State. 
(iv}  The  '<~ider context 
20.  The  Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine problem have  l:xecome  increasingly 
interwoven with other conflicts and  power struggles inside  the region.  The  revolution 
- 13  - PE  73.lfi6/fin. in Iran,  the Soviet =cupation of Afghanistan  and the lran-lrag •,;ar  have created 
new  areas of tension and  new  instabilities,  rendering  a  just and ccmprehensive 
settlement of  the Arab-Israeli conflict on  the one  hand all the more  urgent and on 
the other hand all the  more  difficult.  The  Lebanon  has more  and more  become  a  new 
battlefield in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Changes  in the dispositions of armed 
personnel  and \oJeaponrJ  in  the Lebanon  have  become  related to the said conflict. 
(v)  Recent  developments 
21.  1981  was  marked by  a  nunhcr of spectacular events.  The  assassination of 
President Sadut  threw  into ,·cl ief  not only  th<'  imfJOrt<mn.'  l>ut  also the vulnerability 
of the Camp  David Agreements.  Sadat' s  policy has been continued by Mubarek,  his 
successor,  but  in what  measure  he will attempt to  improve  relations with the other 
Arab States is not yet  cleill~.  V~ean•,;hile,  four Community Member  States  (France, 
Italy,  the Netherlands  and the United  Kingdom)  have  agreed to send contingents to the 
Sinai peace-keeping force,  whose  task is to ensure that the peace treaty between  Egypt 
and  Isra<'l  i,;  duly oJ.•,;c-r-v<·•L  Th<'  uti"''  ('t~IUIIUIIi I y  M<'IIUx·r  Sl  ill<'~'  llo~Vt'  <'t1dnn«.·d  tltic; 
move  as  a  step tO\vards  a  cotnprehemilve peace  settlement based on  mutual  acceptance of 
the principle that all states  in  the  n:<jion  have  a  right to exist and enjoy security, 
and  on  the  need  for  the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right of self-
determination.  The  United  1\in<jdom  can  justi.fiably  look  back with satisfaction on 
this achievement of the  Hr1t.islt  f'rc:coidcncy.  The  p.:Jrtic.ipation of the  four Ccmmunity 
Member  States is also to Israel's advantage,  since it implies,  albeit indirectly, 
their commitment to the  Camp  David process  and hence  to the security of Israel. 
A  further significant development  1-:as  the plan proposed by  Cro\vn  Pnnce  Far.d 
Saudi  Arabia  (Annex  6). 
22.  Th0  plcm  f'Hlvides  for  the  creLJt.icm  of  a  Palestinian Stale \viti!  Jeru:~alP.m as 
its capital  and  rccoqn.i;_,,,  til•'  right of  all  staLes  in the  region  to live  in peace, 
a  formulation  which  coulcl  be  constnJecl as  recognition of  the State of  rsrael.  While 
the plan  require,;  extcnsi'.'C  claci f:lc.ll ion  anrl  obviou,,;ly  cannot be  directly irnplen;ented, 
it is a  point o[  depart arc  fur  further  die ,_·w;cc,ion.  The  plan affords  E<yypt  a  chance 
to end its isolation v;i th11-,  thP  1\rab  v;orlcl  clllli  i:;  foe  this very  reason  of maJor 
iTTlpOrt<_mcY'  tc1  T·;r,-101  .t'·,  \·.'!']1.  f1  i:-~  t )·l('r('((;n•  r;.{("f:'Cdi!lCJly  n~q~·~-.t t-nJ~1c•  l1\,~tt  r:--T-·1, 
d~·t·mc·d  1L  ncct•:;sary  1•J  [-l'."·t·t·cl  v.•1  1 th1•  dr·  r.~~·tll  <~nnc·x.tt ic•n  <ll  t!H··  r;')Lnl  lleif:ltt~;  in 
December  1981,  and  also  to  replace  its military  administration  in  ~he  West 
Bank  by  a  civilian  one,  ,_,Jhich  vJ![tS  seen  by  the  Palestinians  as  a  step  away 
<  trpm 1'!.~~;;~-'~!r{J~dm.'_l_~tc,,t_~_,"' 
23.  It l·iaS  extrcrrcly diffJcult lo predict  the dtrcction  thutthe new  l\r~>'ncan 
Administration  •..:oulll  fo Jlu  .. :  lliiclc'l~  Pn?c;Jdent  Reagan,  ancl  even  n0'-'1  a  degree of  uncerta.inty 
remains.  In  rec:ent  nnnth",  there>  havro  lX'cn  indications that in  the Middle  Eac;t,  and 
particularly  i.r,  the  C:ul f  area,  \~asilinqton has  been  IYKKe  concerned with cucbiny  SovL·2t 
inf  lucence>  than  ·,.;i th  .s:-at.r:_:::-,  has 
also,  on  a  nur,U_:;er  of  o·~c'rJ:-'ilon.s,  pro'  .  .!idcd sufficient evidence that  it  Ls  genuinelj 
..  14  -Nevertheless,  while Washington  has  reached a  'strategic consensus'  with Israel,  the 
most  spectacular arms  deal  has  been  :;truck with Saudi  Arabia. 
24.  The  willingness of  four  Community  Member  States to contribute to the Sinai 
peace-keeping force,  the purpose of which is to ensure continued peace between Egypt 
and  Israel has doubtless been  a  source of considerable satisfaction to the  United States. 
The  interest shown  lly  the  I c"  ~cr in  the  pl <lll  prcol" >sc•d  by Crown  Pr incc  Pilhd of Saudi  Arahiil 
and discussed at greater  length below permits the cautious conclusion that Washington is 
seeking  not only to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict but also to enlist the  support of the 
moderate  Arab States against the Soviet  Union.  For the United States it would,  hCMP'Jer, 
seem advisable to avoid giving distinct priority to the East-West confrontation in the 
Middle East,  since continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict would provide the Soviet 
Union with botn motive  and opportunity  for extending  its  influence  in the area. 
(vii)  E:Ef'  attitude to the Palestinian l?Eoblem 
25.  A change  in  EEC  attitudes towards  the  ~lidtlle  E<1st  has occurred largely as 
a  result of the  increasing importance of the Palestine question over the past  few 
years.  The  United Kingdom  and the Netherlands,  for example  have publicly declared 
their support  for the Palestinian demand  for the right to self-determination.  The 
French Government  has  made  a  statement  in which it opts for  a  Palestinian State. 
In  vic1v  of this change,  the apparent  impa_s_s_e  over  the Camp  David Agreements  and the 
serious  con:=eguences  thdl could result  from  it,  Europe  needs  now  to assert its 
influence  to propose  ne\v  b.:~ses  for discussion,  using the Camp  David Agreements  as 
till~  necessary  tounuation  u:  ,_)n  which  to build European policies. 
c)  The  f'LO  anu  the  Pa~,~stini.:~n  issue 
26.  Although the Palestinians have  been  engaged  in resistance since t.he 
beginning of  the century,  the fXJpular  resistance movements of today only really 
began  tfJ  emC'nJC  c>ince  the>  1948  war- and  nutiilily after the Palestinians'  defeat 
and  sub,;cqu<'nt  br<:H~li  occupation of  Sin<li  ;.md  the Gaza Strip in  1956  - the 
en-ergence of terrorism and guerrilla tactics being  seen as the conseCJUence  of 
the  manifc"~ Arab  inferiority in mobile warfare. 
27.  In  1956,  for example,  a  clandestino Palestini:m l\rab  n<:~tionalist organisation, 
'l\l  Fat.:th'  \-.'as  fonw'cl  hy  a  sm<:~ll  qroup "r Palest inic'ln  <'Xiles  in the Gaza  Strip. 
Tilvn,  in  l~C4,  Ll;o•  1\r<>JJ  C.ovr•nmlE'nl,;  n<:l'ltnq  in  C.:~in> e,;t.illllished  tile  P.:~lestinian 
Liber.Jt inn  ()I"q,_nti.:·;dt ion,  both  i1S  a  crnt rdl  fnunn  for  LIH•  Pa]c-:st  i.ni<m~•  l111Ci  us  wn 
inst run•'tJL  ol·  /\] c~h nmlnJl. 
28.  In  the aftermath of the  1967  ~-o•ar-,  however,  the cult of the Fedayeen  - or 
'Freedom Fighters'  - began to sweep  through  the  Arab cow1tries and  a  whole  range 
of guerrilla groups  spr-ang  up.  Tod<~y,  the  PLO  canprises several diverse groups 
15- PE  73.166 /fin. pledged to the recovery of the Palestinian land and to the establishment of a 
Palestinian State  (see Annex  2).  Since 1969,  Al  Fatah has emerged  as the most 
powerful  and best organised of the resistance movements;  its leader Yasser Arafat 
became  Chairman  of the PLO  in that year. 
29.  The  officially declared aim  .  .-f  t:he  PLO  is to re-establish a  state of 
Palestine and to secure recognition of the rcfugeos'  right to return.  The 
Palestine National Charter - or Covenant of  the PLO  - amended  by the Palestine 
National Council  (the Parliament of the  PLO)  in July 1968  sets out the c0111110n 
political !'lrogranme  of the various Palestinian movements  and goes some  way  to 
spelling out a  future constitution  (see Annex  3).  The  guiding principles of the 
Covenant  are as folla.ts: 
- In the future Palestinian state citizenship will be granted only to those Jews 
who  have  lived  in Palestine since before 1917  (article 6), 
- The  Jews  are not a  nation and consequently possess neither the right to self-
determination nor  the right to an  independent state (article 20), 
- The  Palestinian people are a  nation and  are therefore alone entitled to self-
determination  and  noay  claim possession of the whole  and  undivided territory 
of Palestine  (articles 3  and  21), 
- Any  solution not based on  the right to total liberation of the country must  be 
rejected.  The  objective - the establishment of an  independent state - cannot be 
achieved by  political  l!leans  but  only by  armed  combat  (articles 9  and  21), 
- The  struggle against Israel is legal,  but the defence of  Israeli interests is 
illegal  (articJo 18). 
The  PLO  therefore condemns  the existence of the state of Israel,  whose 
establishment it regards as illegal,  and seeks the establishment of an  independent 
Palestinian state through armed  revolutionary means. 
External  relations of  the PLO 
30.  Under  the  leAdership of  Mr  Yasser Arafat the  PUJ  has  succeeded in gaining 
international recognition,  with its own  representatives  in more  than fifty states. 
Jn  October·  1974  the•  Arab  Sunrni t.  Confen~ttn~ at  Rahilt.  t·ernqniscd the PLO  as  the sole 
representative of the nalestinians.  Then  in November  1979  ~tr 1\rafat was  invited to 
address  the  29th session of  the  UN  General  Assembly  and was  guaranteed the status of 
official  l~ Observer.  Since then Mr  1\rafat has gone  from  triumph to diplomatic 
triumph.  He  has been receiveJ by  the former  Spanish Prime  Minister,  Mr Adolfo 
Suarez  and  by the Austrian Chancellor,  Mr  Bruno  Kreisky.  1'he  Greek  government  has 
offered diplunatic status to :t  PLO  rcprcsentiltion  in 1\thcns. 
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by  sane elements within the PLO,  which  have  shown  a  readiness to accept certain 
ccmprani::;es  and  a  greater interest in intensifying contacts with non-Arab 
organisations such as the European  Communities.  In 1974  the PLO  announced that it 
would  be  ready  to found  a  Palestinian state in any  part of the territory of the 
Palestinian Mandate.  In August  1980,  for exarrple,  Mr  Arafat  1  declared that the 
Palestinians'  objective was  to set up  a  'liberal,  democratic state on  territory 
evacuated by  Israel in which  Moslems,  Jews  and Christians could live together in 
peace'.  In November  1980  he  also dismissed the resolution proposed to the May 
1980  Fatah Conference which called for the liquidation of Israel. 
32.  That  the Middle  East should have  suddenly become  in the early 1960's an 
area of Soviet-American confrontation may  be considered in many  ways  unavoidable. 
After the 1956  Suez  Crisis,  the defeated President Nasser turned for support to 
the Soviet Union,  whilst the US,  anxious to safeguard its security interests in 
the area,  was  for the first time brought  into diplomatic moves  towards  a  peace 
settlement and  soon  established itself as the main  guarantor of the existence of 
Israel.  In addition,  l~ashington had  to fill the gap  left by  the United Kingdan 
and  France. 
33.  The  area lies strategically within the field of tension between the traditional 
spheres of  influence of the two  superpowers,  and  in view of the importance to both 
sides of the oil resources  the region possesses,  events in the countries of the Middle 
East  l1ave  thus come  to have  a  direct bearing on  the state of East-West relations and 
on  the general state of detente.  In recent years the United States has  succeeded in 
retair:ing the  initiative and  occupying  a  dominant  position in the area,  as evidenced 
in [Jarticular by  the expul:-'.ion  of 10,000 Soviet  advisers  fran Egypt  by  President Sadat 
and  the active diplomacy  of the  US  Secretary of State,  Dr  Kissinger,  who  initiated a 
process of rapprochement  in  the  form  of disengagement  agreements  between  Israel on  the 
one  hand  and  Egypt  and  Syria on  the other.  However,  the Soviet Union  remained alert: 
Moscow  concluded treaties of friendship with  Iraq,  Syria and the People's Republic of 
Yemen,  while continuing to bring great political influence to bear on  Damascus. 
The  revolution in Iran and  the Soviet  invasion of Afghanistan have  prcmpted the United 
States to develop a  'Rapid Deployment  Force',  troops which  can be swiftly mobilized 
within the Middle  East  shoula the need arise,  particularly for  the protection of oil 
fields.  While  such  a  move  is understandable,  there is a  danger of it provoking a 
reaction from  the Soviet Union,  particularly if the presence of such a  force is 
conspicuous  through  land bases. 
34.  The  15th Session of the Palestinian National Congress,  in mid-April  1981  has 
revealed a  strong desire for a  closer relationship between  the  PSO  and the Soviet 
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launched an attack on  US  policy in the Middle East,  describing it as an attempt to 
provoke the PLO.  He  added that it was  important  for the PLO  to strengthen its 
ties with  'friendly countries'  -namely the Soviet Union- and the Conqress gave 
a  \varm  welc"me to  'comrade Brezhnev's [Jroposal  on the Middle East and the Palestinian 
issue.' 
35.  This Soviet move  - (placed brlvrP  LllP  XXVI  CPSU  conference)  consisted largely 
of a  proposal to revive the Geneva peace Conference,  which was  convened to seek  a 
peace settlement after the Arab-Israeli war of  1973,  but failed to achieve one. 
36.  During all this period,  the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
has  been silently present in the region.  An  element of uncertainty and potential 
danger  in the Middle  East  lies in the extent to which  Israel,  Iraq and Libya are 
devclq•ing  a  nuclear ca[.Jabilily.  Both col!ntri<'s  have  bc<m  importing materials in 
order  Lo  endt)W  themselves  with  the possibil.ily of using nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes.  But  there have been persistent suggestions  in the European press that 
these materials may  in time be capable of adaptation to military use.  If these 
rerX)rts are based on ·fact,  the acquisition of military nuclear capability by two 
countries at the heart of  the Arab-Israeli  dispute could alter the balance of 
po•..:er  in the Middle  East  and have  untold effects on US-Soviet relations there. 
37.  The  Israeli position is never to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons 
in the region.  This  does  not disclose the actual state of Israeli nuclear weapons 
technology,  research and development.  Not  being  a  party to the Non-Proliferation 
Tn'iJt y  dnd  allrMing only  imperfect  veri ficiJL ion  pnx·t'dures  on  its nuclear  in:>Laliubom;, 
Israel's stance  in 1ecent events such  d';  the raid on  the Iraqi Tarrmuz  reactm: is 
hourrd  to be politic,llly vlt'CJk.  It would  seem  advisable  for  Israel to join the  Non-
Pr.ol il.ct·c~Lion Treaty.  lt should not  be  forgotten  that the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
has  a  withdrawal  clause that could be  used by  Israel when  its highest interests are 
ut stukr. 
38.  The  disruptive effect on oil supplies of a  serj es of military conflicts and 
the subseyuent poU tical  instability in  the Middle  East  throughout the 1970's, 
t<XJCLher  with  the mu:-;s1vc  incrcilse  in oil prices,  has  had extremely serious 
cnnsequences  for  the  indu,;trialiscd nations of Western  Europe. 
39.  The  close  rclation::lrip between oil imports  and  economic  growth in 
Llic·  :.Jcnh.•c  States b>-'Ca!l<'  i ncrcasingly clear  in  tile aftermath of the  1973  oil 
cr1ses.  'ind  \·hlS  one  c;f  r_C"Jc  pr1n-e  motive:-.  for  Lhe  opening of  the  Euro-Arab Dialogue 
in  that year.  Si.{t'/ to 70%  of  E:urope' s  oil  im[Jorts currently come  frr:an  the 1\rab 
('()llllt r·ir•,;  and  the  i''.(}i)(Jrt lOll nr  CNP  tltdt  l·:ttr<lf'{';ll]  t'llllllt.rit'S  ildV<.'  to spc·nd  (ll]  lilcil 
(Ill  Ullj.IUI  t~.;  hd~-_:  t...lf_"'ll  CCJll~tanl ly  r-isin(j. 
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countries constitutes an important element  in any  consideration of the situation in 
the Middle East,  and it is becoming  increasingly important that,  in order to 
mitigate the economic effects of the oil price policies of OPEC,  the European 
COmmunity  supports the process of technological,  economic  and social  modernisation 
of the Arab oil states and their participation in world economics.  Middle  East 
oil also plays an  important role in the ·economy  of  the United States  (comprising 
34% of total oil import::;  in  1981) and the Soviet Union  has  shown  a  particular 
interest in oil from  tLe Gulf States for domestic  consumption,  preferring to use its 
own  supplies to earn valuable investment credits. 
4.  The  role of the European  Cormu:rl.~Y- in  __ the  ~Iiddle East 
a)  The  Euro-Arab  Dialogue 
41.  As  we  have  seen,  the 1973  oil crisis served,  dramatically,  to bring home 
to the European Conr..unity  its dependence  on  the Arab Oil States.  In the same  year, 
therefore,  init::.al contacts were established on  the initiative of the Arabs  between 
the oil-producing countries of the Arab  League  and the Communities,  which  were  later 
formalised into the Euro-Arab Dialogue.  The  main  themes  of this Dialogue are the 
economic  and  industrial developn-cnt  of  the oi 1-exporting countries,  guaranteed 
energy supplies for  the Community  countries and the joint findf1cing  of development 
projects in the Third World Arab  nations. 
42.  ll<.•LIA'l:l'll  l'J7r>  .md  l'fitl di:;,·tl,;::inll:<  W••n·  lic•ltl "'' l'' j.,,  i Ly  l'rol>lt~IH:<  ill  !.lie  I it.•ld 
of agriculture,  industrialisation,  trade,  finance  and scientific a:,d  technical 
cooperation.  The  Arab  side tried also to raise Political aspects.  Follm;ing the 
signature of the Treaty of Peace between  Egypt  and Israel in March  1979,  the Dialogue 
was  suspended.  An  eventual  reopening  of  the discussions will raise the question of 
the status of the PLO. 
b)  The  Venice Declaration 
43.  Since 1973  in particular the Community  Member  States have  also been  active 
concerning the Middle  East on  the  level of political cooperation.  A good start 
was  made  with the Declaration of  Novcmbct·  G,  1973  in which  a  breakthrough  was 
realised concerning the definition of the Palestinian problem.  A quite remarkable 
speech was  made  by  the President-in-office of the Council,  t1r O'Kennedy,  at the 
United Nations General Assembly  on  25  September  1979.  He  enunciated the principles 
on  which  a  settlement must  be based.  These principles are as  follows: 
(i)  The  inadmissibility of t.ltc  acquisition ot:  territory by  for-ce 
(ii)  The  need for  Israel to end the territorial occupation 1-Jhich  it has maintained 
since  the conflict of 1967 
(iii)  Res;..oect  for the sovereignty,  territorial integrity and  independence  of every 
State in  thr.:  area and theu- rigl1t  lo live in peace  within secure  and 
reco:Jnised boundaries 
(iv)  Recognition that in the establishment of a  just and  lasting peace  account must 
be ti.!ken  of  the  legitimate rights of the Palestinians. 
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Government  and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Nine held a  comprehensive 
exchange of views  on  all aspects of the- preSC'nt  situation in the Middle  East.  They 
agreed that growing  tensions affecting the region constituted a  serious danger and 
rendered a  catprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 'rore necessary and 
pressing than ever.'  Basing itself on Security Council Resolutions 242  and 338, 
the European Council expressed concern on  four major  points in its Venice Declaration 
of 13  June  1980  -
- The  ending of the territorial occupation, 
- Self-determination for the Palestinian people, 
- Security in the Middle East, 
- The  status of Jerusalem.  1 
Further, it enunciatC'd  two  hask principles universally accepted by  the 
international community:-
'·- The  right to exi-stence and to security of all the states in the region, 
including Israel,  and 
- Justice for all the peoples which  implies the recognition of the legitimate 
rights of tile Palestinian people.' 
45.  The  Nine  declared that they were  prepared to participate  'within the 
framework  of a comprehensive settlement in a  system of concrete and binding 
international guarantees,  including guarantees on the ground'  and they refused 
all unilateral initiatives whose  puq>Ose  was  to change the status of Israel.  The 
Palestinian people and  the PLO  should be associated with the peace negotiations. 
c)  The  Missions of Messrs.  Thorn  and Van  der Klaauw 
46.  The  Council Presidents responsible,  Mli>ssrs.  Thorn  and Van  der Klaauw  under-
took  contact mis~iom;  in  Lhe  ~'l'Cond hillf .,r  1'180  and  the  first half of 1981,  respectively. 
Mr  Van  der I<laauw  operated on  the basis of a  working  document  that represented a 
broad consensus d!l¥)ng  Community  Foreign Ministers.  It was  designed as an  internal 
report setting out options  for discussion rather than any. final plan for peace. 
According to press reports the working  document  covered  the  four  main  points of  the 
Venice  Declaration 
- lsrad  i  withdrawal 
- Palestinian self-determination 
Security guarantees  for all states in the region 
- Jerusalem 
The  aims  especially of the Van  der Klaauw  mission,  seems  to have been to 
attempt to stimulate the different states and  people  in the region themselves  to get 
~12_volved_j_~_  discussions,  <mel  later negotiations,  and that European  interlocutors 
1  r'or full text see Annex  4 
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47.  Following  a  meeting  with  Mr  Vander  Klaauw  in  Damascus,  the  PLO  leader, 
Mr  Vasser  Arafat,  insisted that  a  European  initiative must  take  full 
account  of  Palestinians'  rights.  Mr  Arafat  refused  to make  any  statement 
which  did  not  challenge Israel's  right  to existence.  In  mid-April  1981, 
the  15th  session of  the  Palestinian National  Council  confirmed  the  general 
hostility to any  European  initiative, especially  since  President  Sadat's 
address  to the  European  Parliament  .  in  February. 
Israeli Reaction·· 
48.  The  meeting  with  Mr  Arafat  prompted  immediate  criticism from  the  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister,  Mr  Yitzh~k  Shamir,  who  on  16  April1981,stronglycondemned 
the activities of  the  Ten  in  the  Middle  East.  The  Minister  strongly  attacked 
Europe's  "pro-Palestinian"  stand,  which  advocated  "solutions  which  could 
only  lead  to  the  total  el  inlination of  Israel",  and  encouraged  the  PLO. 
49.  The  European Council  in June  1981  concludc'd that the Ten  should continue 
'energetically and without  respite'  their efforts to promotE  a  peaceful settlement. 
Ministers wer<  instructed to elaborate further the practical possibilities available 
to Europe to this end by  internal reflection,  while maintaining appropriate contacts 
with all parties concerned,  including the United States.  '!'he  reference to con-
sul·tations with the  USA  would appear to indicate that the European Council has 
accorded an  added  importance to the Camp  David Agreements.  We  have  referred 
elsewhere to the participation of 4  Member  States in the Sinai Peace-keeping 
Force. 
50.  The  Europe of the Ten  has  an  obvious  interest  in promoting a  settlement in 
the Middle  East,  a:-.d  it is clear that  the European Parliament can  and must  now 
adopt  a  coordinated strategy for action  in the Middle  East covering all the main 
problens and crisis points in the area,  and based on  United  Nations Security 
Council  Resolutions  242  and  338. 
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and not contrary to the peace process that has been started at Camp  David.  It is 
necessary,  then,  that a  new  European initiative be presented - not as an alternative 
which might undermine  a::.y  US  mediatory role in the dispute,  but as a  series of 
coordinated actions and  complementary policies developed within the framework  of 
greater consultation and coordination of efforts  The  Ten  should,  therefore, 
continue to consult the USA,  the Arab  States,  the PLO,  other Palestinian representatives, 
and Israel and to inform the  UN  about future proposals  for a  peace settlement. 
The  Palestinian Issue and the PLO 
52.  In particular the European Community  must emphasise the need to draft 
sane  new  suggestions on  UK•  question of  l'.Jle:·t iniun scl r  -determination and 
autonomy,  and on the participation of the Palestinian people,  the PLO  and the other 
Arab  States in the negotiating process aiming at an overall settlement of the dispute·• 
European policies must equally serve to clarify sane basic questicns on the position 
of the PLO  in a  future peace plan.  It should be clear that the Ten  cannot 
recognize the PLO  as the sole representative of the Palestinian pecple.  The 
Palestinians thcm.sclvc:;  arc uble  Lo dc•cidc  by  whcxn  they wish to be represented. 
The  PLO  is nevertheless an  important  factor  in the precessing of a  peace settlement. 
Its importance could be  e.;.hanced if the PLO  were to cease acts of terrorism and to 
repeal those sections of the PLO  Covenant  which  threaten the existence of Israel. 
53.  The  essential element  in the whole  problem would  be  for  Israel and the Palestinian 
pCOf'le,  irwludiny  lilf'  I'Ul,  It)  ll<>ld  t;llf·.:;  with  <'de"il  lllill•r·  ;mel  tn  init  i.1lc~  a  qrdduul 
process  leading to mutual  acceptance and  recognition.  It will be clear that the 
Israeli settlement policy and the question of Jerusalem will be very hard nuts to 
crac~.  One  should not rule out options which  foresee a  total or partial internationalisation 
of Jerusal2m. 
54.  Security is of vital  li~rtance for all states in the  region,  but especially 
for the State of  Israel.  Without convincing security arrangements Israel will never 
agree to any  solution of  the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Once  again,  in this cofltext,  one 
has  to under] ine the [J.:trill)\Otml·  importance of  the Peace Treaty of  1979  between  Egypt 
and  Israel.  On  a  practical level,  the role of the European  Community  could include, 
together with the  USA  and the  UN,  the  linplementation of various military measures. 
For  instance,  MP.mbership  of  Ui<  peace-keeping  forces and the maintenance of de-
militarized sonP.s.  In proposing  this,  one  should never  lose sight of the  fac'c  that 
peace  in the Middle  East is of prime  importance  for  Israel,  but that real hard 
security guarantees can only be  provided by  the United States. 
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and technical levels.  It could render assistance of this type to Israel, to the 
Palestinian people and to other states who  are willing to cooperate.  A  valuable 
stepping stone in this regard was  provided the resolution passed by the European 
Parliament on  26  April 1979,  on the occasion of the signing of the Egypt-Israel 
Peace Treaty.  In this resolution the Council and Camti.ssion are called upon to 
intensify existing links between the European Communities,  Egypt and Israel,  and 
to offer stronger cooperation to those states of the area which are willing 
to participate in the process of achieving a  comprehensive peace settlement. 
56.  The  Oommission  is also instructed to submit concrete proposals to increase 
industrial cooperation between the Communities  and Israel and between the Communities 
and Egypt  as a  contribution to a  development of the region,  and  the Report  includes 
suggestions  for specific projects  in <)rdcr  to increase the industrial capacity of 
both countries to di  ven>lfy the.• i 1- economies. 
A comprehensive settlement 
57.  It must  be clear that a  comprehensive sett  lef'lent . and  a  durable  and  lasting 
peace can be achieved eventually only by bringing in the Soviet Union.  That could 
be done  by  drafting,  in the final stages a  follow-up resolution to Security Council 
Resolution  242.  That  new  resolution should make  explicit reference to the State 
of Israel and to the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. 
P/\RT  JI  I.EDANON 
58.  Although Lebanon  was  part of  the Ottoman  &npire,  its population was 
predominantly Christian.  The  renown  of the Lebanese as successful merchants 
extended far beyond its borders.  Lebanon  was  the place where  the Arab  States met 
the rest of the world. 
59.  During  the  armed conflicts at the end of World  War  I,  the Turkish troops 
were  driven out by  the French and British,  in some  cases with Arab  support.  In 
1926  Lebanon was  placed under French  administration  and was  thereby officially 
separated from  Syria for the first time  in its history. 
60.  In 1943  Lebanon  achieved independence as the Republic of Lebanon.  Under  the 
threat of a  general strike in November  1943,  all social sectors subscribed to a 
compromise  kno1vn  as the  'National Agreement'  which  provided for official posts 
(and consequently the three highest offices of state) to be allocated to the Moslem 
and Christian communities  in a  ratio of 5:6;  this ratio was  based on  the results 
of the  1932  census.  The  agreement contained mutual  concessions:  the Moslems 
renounced union with Syria - i.e.  incorporation in an enlarged Arab community  - and 
the Christians accepted a  Lebanese state  'with an Arab  face'  not protected by 
France. 
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( 1)  Lebanon  is an  independent  sovereign state on  an equal  footing with all the 
other world states. 
(2)  Lebanon  is the  cCl!ITOCln  mother country of all Lebanese,  irrespective of the 
existence of  nl.l!llCrous  re  1 ig  ious  group~:.  Every Lebanese has  the right to 
hold public office,  the sole reservation concerning the numl:er of offices 
allocated to each denomination. 
(3)  Lebanon  is an Arab State,  a  member  of the great Arab  family.  It therefore 
cooperates with ,,ll Arab  States although  it does not enter  into all  i .:t:nces  wit.h 
them or subjugate i tsL' lf to thau. 
62.  This agreement still constitutes the  fow1dations of the Lebanese State 
today;  for several  decades it was  the basis  for a  peaceful partnership between 
the various religious groups  and enabled the political institutions to function 
efficiently. 
63.  The  constitution of the State of Israel  led to an  influx of Palestinians, 
mostly Moslem,  refugees into Lebanon.  The  battles for Jordanian territory and 
Jordan's expulsion of the Palestinians  in 1969  and  1970 led to a  further overall 
increase in the number  of Moslems  in Lebanon.  The  refugees are not recognized 
as Lebanese citizens but they expressly support the demand  made  by the Moslem 
Lebanese that they should have  a  greater say in political life.  The  justification 
for this demand  is that the number  of Moslems  has  increased constantly since the 
1932  census,  and that the 1943  National Agree•nent,  which  governs  the allocation of 
political offices,  should nmv  be revised because at present the majority of the 
population is Moslem  - a  demand  which  is categorically rejected by the Maronites 
and other Christians. 
64.  The  causes of the conflict which  has  been  seething in Lebanon  for  a  decade 
lie partly in the semi-feudal structures of the social system,  which contrast 
sharply with the ultra-modern  democratic  forms;  partly in the  inability of the 
government  to mediate  in the conflict between the religious groups;  and partly in 
the  severe internal and external  pressures affecting Lebanon  because of the Palestinian 
problem. 
65.  The  conflict has  manifested itself in a  continuing civil war,  now  active, 
now  passive,  between  armed elements of the contending  religious groups.  In South 
Lebanon  mainly to laLmch  uttacks on  neighbouring  Israeli territory;  these in turn 
provoke  armed reprisals by  land and air by  the  Israelis.  The  Arab Deterrent Force 
(ADF)  of Syrian soldiers intervened  in Lebanon originally to limit the armed 
hostilities between Christians and Moslems,  to give some  advantage to the latter. 
Ho\vever,  in April  1981  Syrian SAM-missiles of Soviet origin were  for the first time 
used against Christian comnunities  in Zahle,  in south-cast Lebanon.  This action 
provoked Israeli air raids against  the Syrian missile w1its,  thus  further aggravatin<J 
the already tense situation. 
24  PE  73.166/fin. Intensive negotiations,  directed by  the Anerican Under  secretary of State, 
Mr Philip Habib,  brought about a  fragile cease-fire which  has remained fragile because 
the missiles have still not been removed  from  the Bekaa-valley.  A positive 
development was  however  that for the first time indirect contacts have  been established 
between  the State of Israel and the PLO. 
Main  power groups 
66.  The  main  social forces  in Lebanon  are the Christians,  the Mosleoms,  the 
Palestini.ans and the Syrians.  The  Christian sector of the population consists of 
Maronites,  Greek-orthodox Christians and Greek Catholics reunited with Rome  and 
is western oriented.  The  Moslems  belong to the Sunnites,  the Shi' ites and the 
Druze=,  all of which  WC'uld  like to see Lebanon  integrated intc  the Arab  world.  There 
is also a  minority Jewish group. 
67.  The  third large population group consists of approximately 400,000  Palestinian~, 
of wh=,  some  10,000  are armed.  Most  of the PalEstinians are Moslems,  i.e., their 
integration into the political system would  strengthe.: the Moslem  population  and 
exacerbate the conflict between Christians ''nd Moslems  over the allocation of political 
power.  Many  Palestinians are fonrer refugees who  fled to Lebanon  after the 
constitution of the State of Israel in 1948.  The  political mou-thpiece  of the Palestinians 
is the Palestine Liberation Organisation  (PLO)  which  was  founded  in 1964  and has 
its headquarters in Beirut.  The  PLO  claims that the 1969 Cairo Agreement grants the 
Palestinians the right to reside in Southern Lebanon. 
68.  This agreenent was  signed by representatives of the Lebanon,  Egypt  and the PLO, 
at the  instigation of President Nasser;  it governs relations between the Lebanese 
State and  the Palestinians.  Ther  terms of the agreement  are regarded as a  victory 
for the Palestinians living in Lebanon,  who  were  granted the right to take part in 
the  (anred)  Palestinian revolution provided that they agreed to respect the principles 
of Lebanese  sovereignty and security.  In practice the Palestinians were  granted the 
right to wage  their liberation struggle  from  bases on  Lebanese  territory. 
69.  Almost  all the .s_y_rians  in Lebanon  are soldiers of the Arab  Deterrent Force -
some  30,000  strong and  put together after the Civil War  of 1975/76  - who  were  the 
determining factor in the battles in Beirut against the Christian militia.  Their 
presence has  been  in the past,  and at some  times,  useful in guaranteeing to some 
extent peaceful co-existence between  the easern  (Christian)  and western  (Moslem) 
halves of the Lebanese capital. 
70.  There are some  20  different political parties in Lebanon  which cover the 
entire political spectrum.  They  do not,  however,  exert any  determining  influence on 
political  life,  which  is governed mainly by  the religious groups. 
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Republic must be a  Maronite,  the Premier a  Sunnite Moslem  and the President of the 
Chamber  a  Shi'ite.  Executive power  is exercised by  the Chamber  which  has  53 
Christian and 45  l'bslem !l'elllbcrs. 
72.  At  present the following coalitions exist in the Parliament:  the right-wing 
(Christian)  group  (with an overwhelming  majority of Maronites)  consists of Lebanese 
phalangists  (Al  Kataeb)  and the National Liberal Party  (PNL),  who  support a  division 
of Lebanon  into Christian and Moslem  parts.  There is a  group of small left-wing 
parties - the Progressive Socialist Party  (PSP),  the Lebanese Carmunist Party  (PCL), 
which  previously shared a  common  party executive committee with Syria; it  supports 
the PLO  and is the only par<:y  where  membership of a  religious gro  ..  p  is not a 
factor- it is 'multi-denominational'  together with the Organization for Communist 
Action  in Lebanon  {OAC)  they form  the National Progressive Movement.  In addition, 
there is the independent Nasserite movement  which  sees itself as the  'Union of 
Working  People's Force'  and two  Syrian-influenced movements  which play no more 
than a  minor role in parliamentary activities  (the National Syrian Socialist 
Party)  (PSNS)  and the National Syrian Party  (PNS). 
2.  Special situation in South Lebanon 
73.  The  comprehensive nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict is most clearly 
demonstrated in southern Lebanon.  In this area Palestinian guerrillas confront the 
militia units of the Christian Lebanese Major  Saad Haddad,  who  has set up  his own 
state  (Independent  Free Lebanon)  on  a  700  sq.  km.  strip along the Israeli-Lebanese 
frontier.  The  area is also a  target for  Israeli attacks on Palestinian bases which 
have  resulted in a  large number  of dead and wounded  among  the civilian population 
of southern Lebanon. 
74.  Israel receives  arms  from  the USA  for the military protection of its existence. 
The  Carter Administration appealed unsuccessfully to the Israeli Prime Minister Mr  Begin 
not to use  these weapons  for  Israeli interventions in internal Lebanese conflicts. 
75.  The  Lebanese Government  is powerless to intervene in the conflict.  Its own 
army  numbers  barely 6,000  soldiers and  its combat  effectiveness is limited because 
of religious divisions;  consequently it is unable to prevent the conflicts in this 
area.  In view of this situation,  the Lebanese  Government  appealed to the UN  Security 
Council to station UN  troops  in the combat  zone. 
J.  UN  i.ntervcntion  in the Lebanese  Conflict 
76.  As  a  result of Syrian  intervention in Lebanon,  the failure of the ADF, 
increased Israeli attacks and retaliatory strikes in southern Lebanon,  the United 
Nations Security Council  decided in resolutions Nos.  425  and  426  of 16  !-larch  1978 
to station a  UN  force  in the combat  zone  (United Nations  Interim Force  in Lebanon  -
UNIFIL). 
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1.  Israeli troops should be  required to withdraw  from all Lebanese territory. 
2.  Lebanon's territorial integrity and peace in this area should be restored.· 
3.  The Government of Lebanon  should be  assisted in its efforts to restore its 
effective authority in the acea. 
78.  UN  Resolutions Nos.  427/~8,  434/78,  436/78,  444/79  and 450/79 also concern the 
situation in Lebanon:  they extended UNIF'IL's ·mimdat:e  on  several occasions,  increased 
the contingent to a  maximum  of 6,000 men,  strongly criticized Israeli attacks on  · 
Lebanese territory, called on the Israeli Government to withdraw its troops  from the 
combat  zone:  called on the warring  factions to allOY!  the International •Red  Cross 
to have access to the wounded,  extended UNIFD..' s  mandate so  that~ it could act as a 
military unit,  granting it the right t.o  act in self-defence,  and ce.lled on the 
Lebanese Government to dra1v  up  a  programr.e  setting. out the concrete measures  it could 
take to restore its authority. 
79.  The  following IVember  States of the European Ccm:nunity  were  and/or are 
involved in UNIFIL:  France,  Italy,  Netherland and  Ireland.  The  UN  troops are 
only lightly armed and have been attacked on several occasinns by Israeli troops, 
by the Palestinians and by the Christ.ian militias.  UNIFll.,  is stationed south  of  the 
Litani river and north of Major  Haddad's region  (Free J.,ebanon}.  Its task is made  rrore 
difficult by the unwillingness of the warring  factions  to  coo~:x;rate.  It is supported 
only by the pa..:erless Lebanese Government. 
80.  At the European Council  in Venice  in J\J.np  1980,  the Nine  i'~emb-'2r  States stressed 
the need to take  irrrnediate measures to restore peace  in Lebanon  arid  thereby to 
contribute at the  same  time to defusing  the situation  in the 1vhole  of the Middle 
East.  They emphasized the  i.Jrq::ortant  task (]Qvolving on  UNIF'TL  and recalled their 
declaration of  22  April  1980  setting out UNIFIL's  tasks:  it was  to control the 
territory within the internationally recognized frontiers  in southern Lebanon.  The 
European Council meeting at Maastricht in i"iarch  1981,  underlined the support given 
by  the Ten  to UNIFIL  and called on  other nations to do  likewise. 
5.  Missions of Mr Thorn  and Mr  van  cler  KlaaU\oJ 
81.  Following the  Eurc .pean  Council's declaration at Venice  on  the Middle  East, 
the President in office of the Council,  l"lr  THORN,  undertook a  contact mission to 
the Middle  East,  visitirog Lebanon,  Syria,  Jordan, ·rraq,  Saudi-Arabia and Egypt. 
In his talks with Mr  Thorn,  the Lebanese President,  t4r  Sarkis  (~~onite), stressed 
Lilat  in his virw thr  prd>lc-ms  fcl<'rd  hy  Lcbdnon·;nust  rx'  c-on"idcrc!l quite separately 
fran the overall problems  facing  the Middle  East~  Mr Thorn's successor, Mr van der KLAAUW, 
undertook  a  follOYJ-up  mission  in the first half of 198L  After his visit to Lebanon, 
he  stated that at present the  idcea  of  an  internati_orwl  peace-keepina  force  there 
seemed  impracticable. 
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calling for an  irrmediate ceaSE,fire,  the cessation of the Syrian bombardrrent,  the 
withdrawal of all outside forces except UNIFIL,  and the re-establishment of the 
authority of the Lebanese goverment. A further  resolution of  22  April  1982  re 
Palesti~ Liberation  Movement  to  recognise  the  sovereignty of  the  Leban 
Government,  called  for  free  electiorn in  Lebanon  and  insisted that all  f 
forces  be  withdrawn. 
6.  EEC-Lebanon 
83.  The  European  Community's  Cooperation  Agreement  with  Lebanon  was 
signed  in 1977  and  entered into force  on  1  Nove~ber 1978.  It  is of 
indefinite duration and  provides  for  entry  fr2e  of  duty or quantitativ 
restriction into the  EC  for most  industrial  products  and  raw  materials 
Preferential  access  is also granted  for·  imports  of  agricultural  produc 
A financial  Protocol  to the agreement  made  available  a  total  of 
30 mitlian  EUA  in  the  period  ending  31  October  1981.  Some  projects  a 
still being  financed  in the Lebanon  with  funds  made  available under  th 
Protocol.  In  common  with  other Maghreb  and  Mashreq  countries,  the 
Lebanon  has  also  recently  concluded  negotiations for  a  second  Financia 
Protocol,  under  which  over 5  years  50  million  ECUs  will  be  made 
available  (16 million  from  the  EC's  budgetary "own  resources"  and 
34  million  in EIB  loans).  The  signature of  this Protocol  is expected 
to take  place shortly. 
1\s  regards  ·food  aid,  the  1981  Community  prograr.:me  prcvided  tcf 
direct  aid of  10,000 tonnesof  cereals, 1,100 tonnes  of  skimmed  milk 
powder  and  1000  tonnes  of butter-oil  for  Lebanon.  Under  the  1982 
Community  programme,  it is planned  to  send  aid of  20,000  tonnes  of 
::•"reds,  1,100 tonnes  o·f  skim~ed milk  powder  E!nd  10QJ  ~~::;~n~s  c·f  !:..!~ter 
oil.  In  addition,  small  quantities of  ski~rned milk  pc~der and  bu:ter 
oil wcrQ  sent  through  non-governmental  organisation~ in 1931  a~d more 
arc  proposed  for  1982.  Emergency  aid  of  94,000  tcnnes  of  ~kim~cd mit 
powder  is being  sent  through  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red' 
Cross  ~o Lebanon. 
!l'i. 
The  future  Cou_r_s_e 
Parl iarrent  0 ,,  Lebanon  sh0tlld  Lul<e  account of  the 
i>rr)[.X:1~;tds  hy  the  Europr:an 
following  factors: 
l. 1  t  be  c:ought  indcpcndcnt.ly of  a  solution 
l\ soluLion of  the Lcbanm  IJrOJ  em  mus  · 
tho;1gh a  solut1on  of  the latter would  greatl~,.  assist 
of  the t\rdh-lsracli dispute,  ' 
l  t  Of  t he  former  It seems  advisable  to work  in the direction of the 
the set  t  emen  . 
·  ible of  foreign  armed  forces  (lJNIFIL 
v:ilhdr-il'.:al  or disengagement of as many  as poss  . 
.  1 .  ..,  l)  fr~~ t~banon.  Thc'·'c  forces  should in  some  vital arcus be  subst1tuted by  cxr  t1c.:0.t  \.1111  "'- . 
l  . .  or·ccs.  Th i.s  W<>uld  cncate  room  for  rebuilding and rcconstructl.ng 
UN  JX'dn:  kC'Cf' i nq 
)·c·J·r1t.<·•Jr·,·1t.io.11  of  llarldad's C'ntity  in  the country.  One  tl 1r·  j,,·•!r,Hl•'TI,  inf·ludi.J\q  d 
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The  rr:-pc.1t0rl  •.·ul 1s .fnr  thr•  \vithdr,1Wi'1l  of  Isr<'~f'li  and Palt'st.ini.1n  tmits 
lio.tV•~  lx•~JI  UIJ'.•III...'L"l.•:.:.:.illl.  ('  1  L  .•.•li< "nu"  1ons ol  l:.;raeli  att.:u:ks  by  u,,,  UN  Security 
Cotu1cil  have  been  ineffective so far.  In talks with  the PLO,  the Palestinians 
should be asked to negut1ate an  agreement with the Lebanese Govemment which 
1.ould give  them  the right  - at least until a  13.sting settlement of tht' Palestinian 
problem was  uchievecl  - to remain  in a  <Jec)(jruphically well-delineated arc'l of 
Southern Lcl.Janon  (lor exa;m,le,  the 'l'•re area).  Anne·'  t'  b 
.. ,  J  u  ac  1ons  y  the Palestin1ans 
and preventive strikes. 
should come  to an  end  because othei.VJise  Israel  '11  Wl  not agree on stopping reprisals 
To  4educe tension in Beirut and restore that city's position as a  trading 
centre,  the Lebanese Government should be asked to negotiate a  troop withdrawal 
with Syria.  This will not be easy since the Syrians do not regard themselves as 
occupying forces but as menbers of the ADF.  A UN  force could then replace t.he 
Syrians to guarantee the truce in Beirut. 
(d)  UNIFIL's role 
The  numerous  condemnations of attacks on UN  troops by both Israeli 'and 
Palestinian units have been fruitless so far.  The  European Parliarent should call 
on the UN  Security Council to set out afresh the duties  and rights of UNIFIL  and 
give the  UN  [orccs greater  rUUin  for  mantx•uvr<'.  'Jhis might be achieved,  for example, 
by increasing the size of the contingent.  Furthermore,  permanent consultaticn 
groups consisting of officers of the UN  troops and the leaders of the other ;.;arc-in,; 
factions should be set up in order to achieve better cooperation.  The Palestinians 
could be induced to agree to this suggestion if it were pointed out that their refusal 
would lead to a  withdrawal of the UN  troops - a  move  which would result in a  serious 
aggravation of the situation in South Lebanon. 
Major  Haddad's  troops could be persuaded to agree if it were pointed out 
that a:..y  refusal to cooperate would  firstly lead to a  withdrawal of UNIFIL  troops 
and would cut out possibi.lilies for  an  eventual gradual reintPgr.ation of Haddad's 
ent. i ty in the Lell.mon. 
The  European Carmunity should again inform Lebanon that it is ready to 
provide technical and mat.erial  assis·tance should the Lebanese Governrrent  so 
request.  The  Lebanese  Governemnt  should therefore be asked to draw up  a  detailed 
prograrrrne  illuE:trating the extent to which emergency humanitarian aid could assist 
in the restoration of its authority.  In this context,  the problem of rebuilding 
an effective Lebanese  army  and police force  should also be considered.  This would 
have to go  hand in hand  wi~1 the dissolving of militias. 
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The  Israeli  army  invaded  Lebanon  on  6  June  1982.  The  UNIFIL  troops,  as 
was  indicated  in  a  report  by  the  United  Nations  Secretary  General,  could  not 
prf>vent  the  invasion,  as  they  had  neither  the  mandate  nor  thf'  milil<HY  c.Jpar.ity 
to  counter  such  a  strong attack. (1) 
The  operation  'Peace  in Galilee'  was  first  said by  the  Israelis to  be 
aimed  at  protecting  the  civilian population of  Galilee  from  PLO  attacks  from 
Southern  Lebanon.  Nevertheless,  military operations  soon  proved  to  be  on 
a  much  Larger  scale,  Beirut  was  thrown  into a  state of  siege  and  the  Israeli 
Government  made  it clear  that  the  aim  of  the operation was  to  free  Lebanon 
from  the  PLO. 
Syrian  forces  intervened  soon  after  the  invasion  was  Launched  in  an 
attempt  to  hul t  it.  Large  scale air battles ensued  and  a  very  large  number 
of  Syrian  planes  were  shot  down.  Israel  also attacked Syrian missile 
batteries  (SAM-6)  in  the  Bckaa  Valley.  NeverthPLess  in  an  appeal  to 
the  Syrian  President,  Mr  Hafez  al-Assad,  the  Israeli  Prime  Minister,  Mr  Begin 
declared  to  the  Knesspt  that  Israel  did  not  want  war  with  Syria. 
On  5  June  1982,  the  UN  Security  Council  adopted  resolution  508  calling 
upon  all  parties  concerned  to  stop  immediately  and  simultaneously  all  military 
activity  in  I eb;"'""  and  ;,lonCJ  thP.  lsrileli-Lebanese  border.  A second  resolution 
(~O')}  was  ,Jrloptr·d  thf'  followin~ day,  calling  for  the  immediate  and  unconditic.,al 
wi  thdr~w~l  of  thr  Israeli  armed  forces  from  Lebanon. 
Resolutions  511  and  512,  adopted  respectively  on  18  and  19  June,  called 
for  a  prorogation of  the  mandate  of  the  UNIFIL  and  for  humanitarian  aid  from 
the  Red'Cross  and  the  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for  Palestinian Refugees  CUNRWAl. 
(1)  United  Nations  Security  Council;  Report  of  the  Secretary  General  suhmit\Pd 
in  appllc.Jt lfln  of  n:-solut1on  ';()8  (198.')  of  the  United  N,,tion!i  St>curity  Cuunc1l  .. 
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On  9  June  1982  the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs adopted  a  statement 
in  which  they  vigorously  condemned  the  new  Israeli  invasion and  called on 
Israel  to  withdraw all  its forces  immediately  and  unconditionally  from  Lebanon 
and  to  pl.1c:r  thr llNifll  in,, position  to  accomplish  its mission without 
hindr.uu.e  .. 
The  European  Council  of  29  June,  in  its conclusions  on  the Middle  liast 
and  Lebanon,  maintained  the  vigorous  condemnation of  the  Israeli  invasion. 
The  Ten  also stated that  a  final  peace  in Lebanon  required  : 
-the complete  and  prompt  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  from  that  country; 
- the departure of all  foreign  forces  except  those  authorised by  a  legitimate 
and  broadly  representative  Government  of  Lebanon,  whose  authority  would  be 
fully  re-established over all its national  territory. 
The  Ten  indicated  that  'Israel will  not  obtain  the  security to  which  it 
has  a  right  by  using  force  and  creating  !i!i!~_i!££Q~Q!i~ but  it  can  find  this 
security by  satisfying the  legitimate aspirations of  the  Palestinian people, 
who  should  have  the  opportunity  to exercise  their  right  to  self-determination 
with  all  that  this  implies.'  The  PLO  should  be  associated  with  the  negotiations. 
lhP  1t•n  tll~.o  cord irnlt'd  t.tu~  !;usp(!n~ ion  of  the  signature  of  the  second 
Financial  Prototol  with  Israel  and  decided  to  suspend  the  next  Ministerial 
meeting  of  the  EEC-Israel  Agreement. 
The  European  Parliament  adopted  on  17  June  a  resolution  on  the  situation 
in  lf'banon  in  which  it  condemned  both  the  armed  action  in  Lebanon  by  Israeli 
troops,  and  all  the  acts of  terrorism against  Israel  which  had  preceded it. 
The  resolution  insisted on  the  withdrawal  of  all  non-Lebanese  forces  from 
Lebanon;  and  also  cal led on  the  Commission  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  to 
draw  up  immediately  a  programme  of  aid  for  the  victims  of  war. 
8 .s  - \!1Ji!.~!U!.i!l£~~-c~b_~i2~i!!iL~Hi~i!.:t 
From  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  the United States  deployed  considerable 
diplomatic  activity  in  ordE'r  to  reach  a  solution.  PrPsidrnt  Reagan's  special 
PfiVny,  Mr  l'hillp  ti.Jhih,  olpp(  if'd  ··.tuAit II''  diplum.u:y  durinq  lhP  r.risi~,  Vi!;itinq 
alternatively  thr  capitals of  Israel,  of  the  Arab  States  and  also of  lebanon. 
Mr  Habib  submitted various  peace plans  to  the parties, one  of  which  was  finally 
adopted  by  the  LE>banese  Government,  by  Israel  and by  the  PLO  besieged  in West 
Beirut. 
- 31  - PE  73.166/fin. 8.  6-.  !b~_e_~i!f\!i!!iQrJ..P-.!i!rJ 
The  plan provided  for  the  evacuation  from  West  Beirut  of  PLO  and  Syrian 
forces  under  the  supervision of  an  international  force,  to  consist  of  800  French, 
ROO  llnited  S\,)tes  .md t,oo  lt;•l i.ln  troops.  3,000 Lebanese  soldiers  werP  to 
coiiJborate  with  thi5  force. 
The  plan Jlso  indicated  that  : 
-non-militant Palestinians  who  wished  to  live  in  Lebanon  would  be  subject  to 
Lebanese  legisl~tion; 
- the  mission of  the  international  intervention  force  would  be  concluded 
if  one  of  the  points of  the  agreement  had  not  been  observed; 
- the  mandate  of  the  force  of  one  month  might  be  extended  on  request  of 
the  Lebanese  Government; 
- the  evacuation  must  be  completed  within  fifteen  days. 
The  agreement  does  not  specify  the  ultimate  destination of  the  Palestinians, 
but  sJys  that  the  Syrians  will  join units of  their army  in  the  Bekaa  Valley  and 
Northern  Lebanon. 
The  request  for  a  nresence  of  an  international  force  was  announced  on 
18  August  by  the  Lebanese  PrPmier  Shafiq  al-Wanan,  who  said  that  the  Cabinet 
had  marlP  its decision  to  sePk  an  illtl'rndtional  force  on  the  understanding  that 
fflp  f'V.ILIJ,JI  ion  rJidfl  •,f!(JtJid  ht•  the~  first  ·otrr  f11  tht•  irnplPmr.ntilt ion  nf  rr-
sol~t 10ns  508  and  509  of  the  Unitev  Nations  Security  Council. 
Dur inCJ  tho'  two  month~' war,  the  PLO  showed  a  strong willingness  to  start 
a  pol itic.1l  dialogue  with  the  United  States.  The  PLO  President,  Mr  Vasser 
flrC~fat,  siqned  a  nappr·  for  a  UnitPd  States  congressional  group  in  which  he 
stated  his  acceptance  of  all  United  Nations  resolutions  relevant  to  the 
Palestinian question. 
In  an  interview  given  to  the  French  newspaper  'Le  Monde'  on  10  August, 
Mr  Arafat  stated that  after  the  1982  Lebanese  war,  the  entire world  must 
deal  with  the  mattPr  at  an  international  conference,  attended  by  all  the 
counnries  concrrned  as  well  as  by  the  great  powers. 
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The  war  between  Iran and  Iraq started  in  September  1980,  when  Iraq 
invaded  Iran  in order  to gain  control  of  the Shatt-al-Arab waterway 
leading  into the Gulf.  The  war  adds  a  dangerous  element  to the  complicated 
pattern of  the Middle  East.  In  late July  1982,  Iranian  forces  invaded 
Southern  Iraq.  An  eventual  defeat  of  the  Iraqi  Government  could threaten 
other  governments  in the Gulf  with  a  new  outbreak  of  Islamic  fundamentalism. 
8.  9.  - !b~_!!J!!J!:~_fQ~!:~lL 
Proposals  by  the  European  Parliament  on  Lebanon  should  take account  of 
the  f~llowing factors 
ca>  ~~~~!iQ~_Q!.!~~-~~~~~~~~-er:9~!~~-' 
.fl !;olut ion  of  lht•  ll'h.mrst~  problt'm  mu,,t  he  sought  indeJ,Jendently  of 
a  solution of  the  Arab-Israeli  dispute,  although  a  solution of 
the  latter would  greatly assist  the  settlement  of  the  former. 
The  departure of  the  PLO  and  of  Syrian  troops  from  Beirut  should 
represent  the  first  step  towards  the withdrawal  of all  foreign  troops 
from  Lebanon.  To  secure  such  a  withdrawal,  the  Ten  should  consult 
with  the  United States on  Lebanon  and  in particular on  the  replacement 
of  the  UNIFIL  troops  by  an  international  peace-keeping  force  under 
United  Nations  auspices;  this  force  would  be  stationed in Beirut  and 
in other parts  of  the  country.  EEC  Member  States would  participate  in 
such  a  force.  This  would  create  an  opportunity  for  reconstructing 
the  Lebanon,  including  the  reintegration of  Major  Haddad's  entit~  in 
the  country  itself.  One  could also start  then  the  re-building of 
Lebanese  armed  forces  and  police,  and  secure  the disbandment  of 
the militias at  the  same  time.  It  is essential  that  the  reconstruction 
of  the  country  c.hould  take  into  account  thP  r.omriPx  r<~ttern of  the 
v.1r loll',  ~thn;l  IJflliJp~  in  ordf'r  to  ~;at ic;fy  thrir  Legit imat(l'  aspirations. 
It  is  al5o  vi t.Jl  that  armf'd  act ion  by  the non-militant  Palestinians 
who  remain  in  Lebanon  should  be  prevented,  as  otherwise  Israel  might 
be  pushed  to  new  reprisals  and  preventive strikes.  One  might  well 
expect  that  the  newly-elected President  of  Lebanon,  Mr  Beshir  Gemayel, 
will  seek  to develop policies  along  these  Lines. 
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achieved  its main  objective.  Israel  should  nschew  permanent  military 
control  of  Southern  Lebanon  and  should  agree  to  leave  Lebanon.  The  major 
problem  remains  of  the  Syrian  and  armed  PLO  presence  in  Lebanon,  especially 
in  the  Bekaa  Valley.  This  could  lead to  a  new  conflict  between  Israel 
and  Syria.  The  Community,  together  with  the  United States,should therefore 
direct  their  diplomatic  endeavours  towards  a  total  withdrawal  of all 
foreign  forces  from  Lebanon.  Th£>  v~rious groupings  in  the  Lebanon  could 
be  persuaded  to  come  to  a  generdl  agreement  if  it  were  pointed out  that 
any  refusal  to  cooperate  would  firstly  lead  to  a  withdrawal  of  the  inte,-
national  peace-keeping  force  and  secondly  would  eliminate any  possibility 
of  rcr~nstructing the  country. 
The  Europedn  Community  must  continue  supplying  humanitarian  aid, 
particularly  to Lebanon.  Also,  the  European  Community  should, again 
I 
inform  Lebanon  that  it  is  ready·  to provide  technical  and  material 
assistance  should  the  Lebanese  Government  so  request.  The  Lebanese 
Government  should  therefore  be  asked  to  draw  up  a  detailed  programme 
illustrating  the  extent  to  which  emergency  humanitarian  aid  could 
assist  in  the  restoration of  its authority. 
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22  November  1967 
Security Council Resolution  242  (1967) 
The Security Council, 
Expressi_l)S. its continuing  concer.n with  the  grave  situation  in 
th~ Middle  East, 
Emphasizing  the  inadmissibility of  the acquisition of  territory 
by war  and  the  need  to work  for a  joo  t  and  lasting  peace  in which  every 
State  in  the  area  can  live  in  security, 
Emphasizing further  that all Member  States  in  their acceptance  of 
the Charter  of  the United  Nations  have  undertaken  a  commitment  to. act 
in accordance with Article  2  of  the Charter, 
1.  Affirms  that  the  fulfilment  of  Charter  principles  requires  the 
establishment  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the Middle  East  which 
should  include  the application of  both  the  following  principles: 
(i)  Withdrawal  of Israel armed  forces  from  territories occupied  in 
,. 
the  recent  conflict; 
(ii)' Termination of all claims  of states  of belligerency and  respect 
for and  <ickowledgement  of  the  sovereignty,  territorial integrity and 
pol,itic!al  independence  of  every State  in  the  area  and  their  right  to 
live  in  peace within  secure  and  recognized  boundaries  free  from  threats 
of acts  of  force; 
2'.  Affirms  further  the  necessity: 
(a)  For  guaranteeing  freedom  of  navigation  through  international 
waterways  in  the area; 
(b)  For achieving  a  just  settlement  of  the  refugee  problem; 
(c)  For  guaranteeing  the  territorial  inviolability and  political 
independence  of every State  in  the  area,  through measures  including 
the  establishment  of  demilitarized  zones; 
3.  ~Requests the Secretary-General  to designate  a  Special  Representative 
to  proceed  to the  Middle  East  to establish and  maintain contacts with  the 
States concerned  in order  to  promote  agreement  and  assist efforts Ito 
achieve  a  peaceful  and  accepted  settlement  in  accordance  with  the  pro-
visions  and  principles  in  this  resolution; 
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4.  Requests  the Secretary-General  to report  to the  Security Council 
on  the  progress  of the efforts  of  the Special Representative as  soon as 
possible. 
22  October  1973 
Security Council Resolution  338  (1973) 
Demand  of  Cease-Fire  in  the  Middle  East 
The  Security Council 
1.  Calls  UEQn  all parties  to the  present  fighting  to cease all firing 
and  terminate all military activity  immediately,  no  later than  12  hours 
after the moment  of  the  adoption  of  this decision,  in  the  positions 
they  now  occupy; 
2.  Calls  upon  the  parties concerned  to start  immediately after 
tfle  cease-fire  the  implementation of Security Council resolution 242 
(1967)  in all of  it~ parts; 
3.  Decides  that,  immediately and  concurrently with  the  ~ease-fire, 
negotiations  shall start between  the  parties concerned  under appropriate 
auspices  aimed  at establishing a  just and  durabl.e  peace  in the Middle 
East. 
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Some  estimates  indicate  that  there have  been as  many  as  100  groups 
defining  themselves  as  fedayeen  and  dedicated  to the  liberation of 
Palestine.  Between  1967  and  1977  alone,  over  30  such  organisations 
emerged,  all extremely divided  and  fragmented.  However,  the main 
resistance  groups  are as  follows: 
The  Palestine National Liberation  Movemen~  (Al  Fatah) 
Founded  in  1957  - leader  Yasser Arafat 
Political spokesman  - Faruq Qaddumi 
The  largest guerilla group  - numbering  some  7000  men 
Also  the  best  known  and  the most  acceptable  group  to the Arab 
Governments 
The  least extremist  group,  contains  both  Left  and  Right  wing  elements 
Based  in  the  Lebanon  - does  not  bnlieve  in operations outside  the 
Middle  East  involving  innocent  neutrals. 
The  Popular  Front  for  the Liberation of  Palestine  (PFLP) 
Founded  1967/68  - leader George  Habash 
The  second  largest  of  the  commando  groups  - membership  of  about  3500 
Believes  in  resistance  both within  and  outside  the Middle  East 
Extremist  group  - concentrates  on  urban  sabotage  and  on  special 
operations  such  as  hijackings  and  bombings.  Marxist-Leninist 
connections. 
The  Pop•Jlar  Democratic  Front  for  the Liberation  of  Palestine  (PDFLP) 
Founded  1969  from  a  split  in  the  PFLP  - leader  Nayif  Hawatmeh 
Advocates  local  rather:- than  remote  actio11 
Probably  numbers  only  a  couple  of  hundred  men  based  around  Lebanon's 
southern  border with  Israel.  Strongly  pro-Moscow. 
The  Popular  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  Palestine  - General  Command 
Founded  1968  again  from  a  split  in  the  PFLP  - leader Ahmad  Jibril 
Has  the  reputation  of  being  one  of  the  toughest  of  the  guerrilla  groups 
Numbers  only about  200  men  - based  in  Lebanon. 
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Vanguards  of  the  Popular  Liberation War  (Al  Sa'iqa) 
FocJnde?d  1968  by  the  Syrian  Fla'ath  Socialist  Party  - leader:- Samini l\t:tari 
Spnnsured  by  Syria.  Fedayeen  drawn  frpm  Palestinian  rcfuy<'C  camp';  in 
Syria  and  Lebanon 
Seldom  mounts  any  commando  raids. 
Arab  Liberation Front  (ALF) 
Founded  1969 and  sponsored  by  Iraq.  Leader  Abd  al Wahhab 
al-Kayyali.  The  smallest  of  the  resistance  groups. 
In addition  the  PLO  maintains  a  regular military force  known 
as  the  Palestinian Liberation Army  (PLA). 
Increasingly,  the  organisation of  the  Palestinian  Resistance 
is  split  between  the militants  and  the  moderates.  The  hard-liners 
defend  the  view  that  only  force  can  liberate  Palestine and  that 
negotiations  could  never  produce  more  than  an  unsatisfactory 
compromise.  Others  are  willing  to-explore  the  possibility of  a 
negotiated  settlement and  suggest  readiness  to compromise  both  on 
the  extent  of  a  Palestinian state  (that  is, whether it should  include 
all the  territory West  of  the  River  Jordan  or  only  on  the West  Bank 
and  Gaza)  and  on  the  means  of  achicvin<J  j t. 
----------
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!HE CO?J::-.;A.l$  OF  THE  PltLFfSTINE  LI9ERATION  ORGANISATION  (PLO) 
of July  1968 
( 'P•leiJtinian Nationa  1  Covenant') 
(PE  43.623) 
Translation  from  th¢ original French  by  tho Secretariat of  the  European 
ParU.ament; 
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PRELIMINARY  PE-11\RKS 
'l11c  ldt.cst VC>r:;ion  o( the Covenant,  dales July  l9GC,  sets out tile corrrnon 
political  pr6grarrmc of t;hc  various Pdlcst..ini<m nnvPnlC'nts  that m,Jkc  up  til<'  Pf/J, 
and yncs  ,;orne  way  to spelling out  a  future constitution. 
'l'IH~  JlrPVi•HI!i  V(~J":iiOtl  cJI  l!u•  ('IJ\If!l\ialll  w:.1H  1ll"dWII  llfl  ill  llu•  fir·!;l.  l'aiPslillirlll 
Congress  held  in  Jerusalem  in  May  1964,  when  the  PLO  was  fr·  nded. 
(The  official English  t:ranslation  referred  to it as  a  'Covenant'.) 
The  preamble  concluded  - and  still concludes  - with  an  oath  binding  the 
signatories  to  implement  the Covenant. 
The  1964  Congress  decided  that  the  Palestinian National Councii  - the 
supreme  body  embracing  the  Palestinian organisations  - would  meet  periodically 
and  that  amendments  to  the  text  of the Covenant  could  only be  adopted  by  a 
two-thirds  majority 6f  its .members. 
Following  changes  within  the  PLO  after  the  1967  'Six-Day War',  the 
Palestinian National Council met  in Cairo  from  1  to  17  July  1968  for  its 
IVth Session  and  amt:lnded  the  Covenant. 
Practically all the  Palestinian organisations  existing  in  the Arab 
couptries  took  part  in  this Congress,  including  the most  important  fedayin 
organisations.  El  Fatah  and  the  fedayin  organisations  under  its  influence 
had  37  seats  in  the Council  out  of  a  total of  100,  compared  with  the  ten 
held  IJy  the  repre:oentat~ves of  the  'Popular  rr-ont  for- the  Liberation of 
Palestine'.  Since  the  'har-d-line'  movements  were  so  strongly  repr-esented, 
it may  be  assumed  that  th~ amendments  that  produced  the  present  ver-sion  wer-e 
carefully discussed  and  assessed. 
The  guiding  pdnci pies  of  the  Cov<'nant  the  full  text  of  which  is  given 
- r·n  the State  of  P<~lestine oply  those  Jews  who  were  living  in  Palestine 
before  1917 will be  recognised  CIS  citizens  (Article 6); 
- The  Jews  do  not  constitute a  nation and  have  no  right  of  self-determination 
nor  any  right  to  a  state of  their  own  (Ar-ticle  20); 
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-Only  the  Palestinians  can  claim  the  right  of  :;elf-determination and  fulland 
total  possession of  the  country  (Articles  3  and  21); 
- Any  solution which  does  not  consist  in total liberation of  the  country will 
be  rejected;  this  aim  cannot  be  achieved  by  political means,  but 
by military means  (Articles  9  and  21) ; 
- The  struggle  against Israel is  lawful;  on  the  contrary,  any defence 
offered  by  Israel is  not  (Article  18). 
TilE  PALESTINIAN  NATIONAL  COVENAN1'_ 
Palestine  is  the  fatherland  of  the  Palestinian Arab  people;  it constitutes 
an  inseparable  part  of  the  great Arab  fatherland  and  the  Palestinian 
pcrJplc  for:m  part  of  the  Ar:ab  nation. 
Article  2 
Within  the  frontiers  of  the  British mandate,  Palestine  forms  an  indivisible 
territorial unit. 
Article  3 
The  Palestinian Arab  people  hold  a  lawful  right  to their  fatherland  and 
the  right  to  determine  their destiny after achieving  the  liberation of 
their country  in accordance  with  their  own  wishes  and  resolve. 
Article  4  ------
The  Palestinian  identity is  fundamental,  essential  and  intrinsic;  it is 
incltssolublc  and  passes  from  father  to son.  The  Zionist  occupation  and 
the  dispersal  of  the  Palestinian Arab  people  as  a  result  of  the disasters 
they  suffered  do  not  affect  or call in question  their  Palestinian identity 
or  their membership  of  the  Palestinian  community. 
,1\  r t  i c l e__2 
Palestinians  are  the  Arab  citizens  who  were  living  permanently  in  Palestine 
until  1947,  regardless  of  whether  they have  been  expelled  or are still there. 
Anyone  born  of  a  Palestinian  father after that date,  either in  or outside 
Palestine,  is  a  Palestinian. 
The  Jews  who  were  living  permanently  in  Palestine  up until  the  beginning  of 
the  /Cionist  invasion  shall  be  considered  Palestinians. 
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l\rticle  7 
The  fact  that  ther-e  exists  a  Palestinian community  and  that it has  material, 
spiritual and  historical links  wit~ Palestine is incontrovertible.  It is 
a  national duty  to educate  the  individual  in  line with  the Arab  revolution. 
Every means  must  be  employed  to  provide  a  link between  the  Palestinian and 
his  country  in  the  fullest  sense,  both spiritual and material.  He  must  be 
prepared  for  armed  struggle and  the  sacrifice of  his  possessions  and  his 
life  for  the  purpose  of  regaining  his  fatherland  and  completing  the  liberation 
of his  territory. 
Ar~_icle  8 
The  Palestinian Arab  people  are at this  stage  fighting  for  the  liberation 
of  Palestine.  The  contradictions  between  the  Palestinian national  forces 
are  ther-efore  secondary  and  must  be  relegated  to  the  background,  whereas 
':he  major conflict,  that  between  the  Zionist  and  imperialist  forces  and 
the  Palestinian Arab  people,  must  be  resolved.  On  this  basis,  the  Palestinian 
masses  in  the  occupied  national fatherland  or  in  the diaspora  (al ma'hdjar) 
consitute,  both  as  organizations  and  as  individuals,  a  national  front  working 
for  the  redemption  of  P.alestine  and  its  liberation  through  armed  struggle. 
Armed  struggle  is  the  only  path  to  the  lib-=ration  of  Palestine.  It  is 
ther-efore  a  strategy and  not  a  tactical phase.  The  Palestinian Arab  people 
con finn  their absolute detemination and  firm  resolve  to continue  their 
.armed  struggle and  to work  towards  a  popular  armed  revolution  for  the 
liberati.on  of  their:- coc1ntry  and  its restitution.  The  Palestinian Arab 
people  also  reassert  their  right  to a  normal  life  in Palestine,  the  exercise 
of  their  right  of  self-determination and  their sovereignty  over  it. 
The  Palestinian  people's  war  of  liberation centres  on action by  the 
con'r.'andos.  This  must  be  intensified,  extended,  its development  safeguarded 
and  the  full  Palestinian  potential  in men  and  experience must  be  mobilized; 
they must  be  organized  and  associated with  the  armed  Palestinian  revolution, 
bringing  into  play  the  combined  effect  of  the  national struggle  (watani)  by 
the  various  groups  making  up  the  Palestinian Arab  people  and  the  Arab masses 
(in  Arab  countries)  to ensure  that  the  revolution  is  continued,  extended 
and  i I'  t  r i um;,ha11t. 
llrticle ll 
Palestinians  shall uphold  three  principles: 
National  union  (\vataniya),  national mobilization  (gaoumia)  and  liberation. 
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Article  12 
The  Palestinian Arab  people  believe  in Arab  unity and  Arab  unification. 
They  therefore  believe  that  in order to achieve  this objective  they must, 
at this  sta.ge  in  the national struggle,  safeguard  their Palestinian 
identity and  all that  this entails,  strengthen  the awareness  of  their 
identity and  reject any  scheme  liable to destroy or weaken  it. 
Article  l3 
Arab  union  and  the  liberation of  Palestine are  complementary objectives. 
The  achievement  of  one  of  these  objectives  shall constitute  a  preparatory 
stage  for  the  other.  Arab  union  paves  the  way  for  the  liberation of 
Palestine,  and  the  liberation of  Palestine  paves  the way  for Arab  union. 
Action  to  achieve  one  of  these  two  objectives  goes  hand  in  hand  with action 
to achieve  the  other. 
ArticL!  14 
The  destiny of  the Arab  nation and,  beyond  it,  the Arab  existence  itself, 
depend  on  the  fate  of  the  Palestinian cause.  This  link between  these  two 
destinies  is  the  foundation  for  the  efforts  of  the Arab  nation and  its 
work  towards  the  liberation of  Palestine.  The  Palestinian  people will 
maintain its  leading  role  in  the  achievement  of this  sacred  national 
objective  (gaoumi). 
Article  15 
From  the Arab  viewpoint  the  liberation of  Palestine is a  national duty 
(gaoumi) ,to drive  back  the  Zionist  and  imperialist  invasion  from  the 
terri~ory of  the Arab  fatherland  and  to cleanse  Palestine  of  the  Zionist 
existence.  The  full  responsibility for  this  rests  on  the  Arab  nation, 
both  peoples  and  governments,  and  at their head,  the  Palestinian Arab 
people.  It  is  with  this  aim  that  the  Arab  nation  owes  it to 
itself  to mobilize  its full military,  human,  material  and  spiritual 
potential  to actively assist  the  Palestinian Arab  people  in  the  liberation 
of  Palestine and,  at  the  present  stage  of  the  Palestinian armed  revolution, 
to offer unstintingly  to  the  Palestinian Arab  people  every aid  and  every 
material  and  human  support,  to  provide  them  with every means  and  facility 
to  continue  to fulfil their  leading  role,  to carry  on  their armed  revolution 
until  their fatherland  is  liberated. 
Article  lG 
From  the  spiritual viewpoint,  the  liberation of  Palestine will endow  the 
Holy  Land  with  an  atmosphere  of  peace  and  calm  in which  the  holy  places 
will  be  safeguao:-ded  and  which  will guarantee  freedom  of  religion  and  wi 11 
allow entry  by  everyone,  regardless  of  race,  colour,  language  or religion. 
It is  for  this  reason  that  the  Palestinians  hope  for  support  from all the 
spiritual forces  of  the  world. 
- 43  - PE  7 3 .166/fin. I Ann .3 ANNEX  3 
Article  17 
From  the  human  viewpoint,  the  liberation of  Palestine will restore  to  the 
Palestinian his  honour,  his dignity and  his  freedom.  The  Palestinian  people 
therefore  count  on  the  support  of  everyone  in  the  world  who  believes  in man's 
honour  and  his  liberty. 
Article  18 
From  the  international viewpoint,  the  liberation of  Palestine is  a  defensive 
action dictated  by  the  needs  of  self-defence.  The  Palesl '.nian Arab  people, 
desirous  of maintaining ties  of  friendship with all  peoples,  therefore  count 
on  the  support  of all States which  believe  in  freedom,  justice and  peace, 
so  that  legality will be  restored  in  Palestine  and  its community will be  able 
to exercise national  sovereignty  (wataniya)  and  national  fr:eedom  "(gaoumiya). 
Article  19 
The  partition of  Palestine  in  1947  and  the  creation of Israel are  null and 
void,  regardless  of  how  much  time  passes  before  the  situation is  reversed, 
since  they  conflict with  the will of  the  Palestinian Arab  people  and  their 
natural right  to their fatherland.  The  creation of Israel and  the  partition 
of  Palestine  from  which  itstern1ted  are  therefore  in contradiction with  the 
United  Nations  charter and  above all with  the  right of  peoples  to self-
determination. 
Article  20 
The  BALFOUR  Declaration,  the  Palestinian mandate  and  the  ensuing develop-
ments  will be  considered  null  and  void;  the  claims  of  a  histcrical and 
spiritual  link  between  the  Jews  and  Palestine  are  incompatible with  the 
historical facts  or with  the  real  conceptions  from  which  the  concept  of 
statehood  derives.  l\s  Judaism  is  a  divine  (i.e.  revealed)  religion,  it 
cannot  constitute  a  nationality enjoying  an  independent existence; 
similarly,  the  Jews  are  not  a  people  with  a  specific  identity;  on  the 
contrary,  they are  the citizens of  the  states  to which  they belong. 
Article  21 
In  expressing  its existence  as  an  entity  through  the  Palestinian Arab 
revolution,  the  Palestinian Arab  people  reject  any solution  that  sought 
to  replace  the  complete  liberation of  Palestine  by  any  other proposal; 
they also  reject  any  plan  to  suppress  or  internationalise  the  Palestinian 
problem. 
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Article  22 
Zionism  is  a  political movement  organically  linked with  international 
imperialism,  which  is hostile  towards  any freedom  action and  any  pro-
gressionist movement  in the world.  By  nature it is a  fanatical racist 
movement,  in its aims  it is aggressive,  expansionist  and  colonialist and 
in its methods  it is Nazi-fascist.  Israel is  the  instrument of  the Zionist 
movement  and  the  human  (in  the  sense of  human  members)  and  geographical base 
of world  imperialism and  represents  its base and  springboard  in the very 
heart of  the Arab  fatherland,  from  which  to strike at the  hopes  of the Arab 
nation for  liberation,  union and  progress. 
Article 23 
The- needs  of security and  peace,  as well as  those  of right and  justice, 
require all States which are anxious  to maintain friendly relations  between 
peoples  and  ensure  their citizens are  loya 1  to their respective countries, 
to consider Zionism  an illegal movement  and  ban  its existence  and  activities. 
Article 24 
The  Palestinian Arab  people believe  in the  principles of  justice,  liberty, 
sovereignty,  self-determination,  human  dignity and  the  right  of  the peoples 
to enjoy  them. 
Article 25 
To  achieve  the aims  of  the Covenant  and  its principles,  the  Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation will fulfil its role until the  liberation of 
Palestine·is  completely achieved. 
Article  26 
The  Palestinian Liberation Organisation,  which  represents  the  Palestinian 
revolutionary forces,  is responsible  for  the movement  of  the  Palestinian 
1.rab  people  in their struggle for  the  restitution of  their fatherland  and 
its liberation,  the  restoration to  the  latter and  the exercise within its 
territory of  the right of self-determination.  This  responsibility extends 
to all fields;  military,  political,  financial and  everything  that  the 
Palestine  problem calls for at  the Arab  level and  the  international level. 
Article  27 
The  Palestinian Liberation Organisation will cooperate with all the Arab 
states,  each according  to its capabilities,  and  will adopt  a  neutral 
attitude  towards  them .in accordance with  the  needs  of  the  war  of  liberation: 
and  on  this  basis it will not  interfere  in  the  internal affairs of  any Arab 
state. 
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Article  28 
The  Palestinian Arab  people emphasise  the  deeply rooted authenticity of  their 
national revolution and  their  independence,  and  therefore reject any  form 
of  intervention,  trusteeship or satellite status. 
The  Palestinian Arab  people  have  the  fundamental,  essential and  authentic 
right  to  liberate  Palestine and  re-establish it as  their fatherland.  The 
Palestinian Arab  people will determine  their position  tm-1ards  the various 
states and  forces  on  the basis of  their attitude  towards  the  Palestinian 
problem  and  the degree  of support  they  have  given  the  Palestjnian Arab 
people  and  their  rnvolution aimed  at achieving  the objectives  they  had  set 
themselves. 
,: Article, 30 
The  fighting  forces  and  those who  bear arms  in  the war  of  liberation make  up 
the  nucleus  of  the Arab  army,  which will constitute the  protective  force 
guaranteeing success  for  the Palestinian Arab  people. 
Article  31 
The  Palestine Liberati,on Organisation will have  a  flag,  an  oath and  an 
anthem which will be determined  by special agreement. 
Article .32 
To  the articles  of  this  Covenant  shall be  added  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
Palestine Liberat;_on Organisation  laying down  the way  in which  the Organisation 
shall  be  composed,  its organs,  its committees,  their objectives,  obligations 
and  commitments  in accordance with  the  text  of  the Covenant. 
Article  33 
The  texts  of  the  Covenant may  only be  amended  by a  two-thirds majority of 
all the members  of  the National Council  of  the  Palestine Liberation 
Organisation meeting  in extraordinary session convened  for  the  purpose. 
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TilE  VENICE  DEC LA RATION,  I  ~l!)J$....,l.~§.O 
Middle  East 
1.  '1. The  Heads  of State or Government  and  the Ministers  of Foreign 
Affairs  held  a  comprehensive  exchange  of  views  on all aspects  of  the 
present  situation in  the Middle  East,  including  the state of  n~gotiations 
resulting  from  the  agreements  signed  between  Egypt  and  Israel  in March 
1979.  They agreed  that  growing  tensions  affecting this  region constitute 
a  serious danger  and  render  a  comprehensive  solution to  the  Israeli-Arab 
conflict more  necessary and  pressing  than ever. 
2.  The  nine Member States  of  the European  Community  consider  that  the 
traditional ties  and  common  interests which  link  Europe  to the  Middle 
East  oblige  them  to play a  special role  and  now  require  them  to work  in a 
more  concrete way  towards  peace. 
3.  In  this  regard,  the  nine  countries  of  the  Community base  themselves 
on  Security Council  Resolutions 242  and  338  and  the  positions which  they 
have  expressed  on  several occasions,  notably  in  their Declarations  of 
29 June  1977  ,  19  September  1978  ,  26  March  and  18  June  1979  ,  as well as 
in  the  speech  made  on  their behalf  on  25  September  1979  by  the  Irish 
Minister  of Foreign Affairs at  the  thirty-fourth United  Natio~s General 
Assembly. 
4.  On  the bases  thus  set out,  the  time  has  come  to  promote  the 
recognition and  implementation  of  the  two  principles  universally accepted 
by  the.' international  community:  the  right  to existence  and  to security 
of all the States  in  the  region,  including Israel,  and  justice  for all the 
peoples,  which  implies  the  recognition of  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinian people. 
5.  All  of  the  countries  in  the area  are entitled  to  live  in  peace 
within  secure,  recognised  and  guaranteed  borders.  The  necessary guarantees 
for  a  peace  settlement  should  be  provided  by  the  UN  by  a  decision  of  the 
Security Council  and,  if necessary,  on  the basis  of  other mutually agreed 
procedures.  The  Nine  declare  that  they are  prepared  to participate within 
the  framework  of  a  comprehensive  settlement  in  a  system of  concrete  and 
binding  international guarantees,  including  (guarantees)  on  the  ground. 
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which  is not  simply  one  of  refugees.  The  Palestinian  people,  who are 
conscious  of existing as  such,  must  be  placed  in a  position,  by an 
appropriate  process defined within  the  framework  of  the  comprehensive 
peace  settlement,  to exercise  fully their right  to self-determination. 
7.  The  achievement  of these objectives  requires  the  involvement  and 
support  of all the  parties  concerned  in  the  peace  settlement  which 
the Nine  are  endeavouring  to  promote  in keeping with  the principles 
formulated  in  the declaration referred  to above.  These  principles 
apply  to all the  parties  concerned,  and  thus  the  Palestinian people, 
and  to the  PLO,  which will  have  to be  associated with  the  nego~iations. 
8.  The  Nine  recognise  the special importance  of  the  role  played  by 
the  question  of Jerusalem for all the  parties  concerned.  The  Nine 
stress  that  they will not  accept  any unilateral initiative designed 
to change  the  status  of  Jerusalem and  that  any  agreement  on  the city's 
status  should  guarantee  freedom  of access  for everyone  to the  Holy  Places. 
9.  The  Nine  stress  the  need  for  Israel to  put  an  end  to the territorial 
occupation which it has  maintained  since  the conflict of  1967,  as it has 
done  for  part  of Sinai.  They are deeply convinced  that  the Israeli 
settlements constitute  a  serious obstacle to the  peace  process  in the 
Middle  East.  The  Nine  consider that  these  settlements,  as  '"ell as 
modifications  in  population and  property  in  the  occupied Arab  territories, 
are illegal under  international law. 
10.  Concerned  as  they are  to  put  an end  to violence,  the  Nine  consider 
that  only  the  renunciation of  force  or  the threatened  use  of  force  by all 
the  parties  can create  a  climate of  confidence  in  the area,  and  constitute 
a  basic  element  for  a  comprehensive  settlement  of  the  conflict  in  the 
Middle  East. 
11.  The  Nine  have  decided  to make  the  necessary contacts with all the 
parties concerned.  The  objective  of  these contacts  would  be  to ascertain 
the  position of  the  various  parties with  respect  to the  principles  set  out 
in  this declaration and  in  the  light  of  the  results  of  this  consultation 
process  to determine  the  form  which  such an  initiative  on  their part 
could  take.' 
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Muha~mad Anwar  Al-Sadat,  President of  the Arab  Republic of Egypt,  and 
~lenachem Begin,  Prime  Ministttr of  Israel,  met with Jimmy  C3rter,  President 
of the  United  .. States of America,  at Camp  David  from  5  September  to 
17  September,  1978,  and have  agreed on  the  following  framework  for  peace 
in  the  Midole  East.  They  invite other parties  to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
to adhere  to it. 
PilEAMBLE 
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The  search for  peace in the Middle  East must be  guided by  the  following: 
- The  agreed basis  for  a  peaceful settlement of the conflict between 
-·rsraql and  its neighbours  is United Nations  Security council  Resolution  242, 
in all its parts. 
- After  four wars  during  30  years,  despite intensive human  efforts, 
the Middle  East,  which is  the cradle of civilisation and  the birthplace of 
three great religions,  does  not yet enjoy the blessings of  peac~.  The 
people of  the  Middle  East  yearn  for  peace so that the.vast human  and 
natural resources of  the  region can be  turned to the pursuits of peace 
and  so  that  this area can become  a  model  for  co-existence and cooperation 
a:nong  nations. 
- The  historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem 
and  the  reception accorded  to him by the  Parliament,  government  and  people 
of Israel,  and  the  reciprocal visit of  Prime Minister  Begin  to Ismailia, 
the  peace  proposals  made  by both  leaders,  as  well as  the warm  reception of 
these missions  by  the  peoples  of both countries,  have  created an  unpre-
cedented opportunity for  peace  which  must not be  lost if this generation 
and  future  generations are  to be spared  the  tragedies of war. 
- The  provisions of the Charter of  the  United  Nations  and  the other 
accepted  nor~s of international  law  and  legitimacy now  provide accepted 
standards  for  the conduct of relations  among  all states. 
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th<'  Unit<'cl  Nation!!  Charter,  future  nr.qotiation9  between  Israel  and  any 
n"i•jhbour  prepared  to negotiate  peace  and security with it,  are n  ..  cessary 
for  the  purpose  of carrying out all the  provisions  and principles  of reso-
lutions  242  and  338. 
- Peace  requires  respect for  the sovereignty,  territorial integrity 
and  political independence of every state in the area and  their right to 
live  in peace within secure  and  recognised boundarfes  free  from threats or 
acts of force.  Progress  towards  that goal  can  accelerate movement  towards 
a  new  era of reconciliation  in the  Middle  East marked by cooperation in 
promoting economic  development,  in maintaining stability,  and  in assuring 
security  .. 
- Security is enhanced by  a  relationship of peace and by cooperation 
between  nations  which  enjoy normal  relations.  In addition,  under  the  terms 
of  peace  treaties,  the  parties can,  on  the basis of reciprocity,  agree  to 
special  securit~ arrangements  such as  demilitarised  zones,  limited arma-
ments  areas,  early warning  stations,  the  presence of international forces, 
liaison,  agreed measures  for  monitoring,  and other arrangements  that they 
agree are  useful. 
FRANEWORK 
Taking  these  factors  into account,  the  parties are determined.to reach 
a  just,  comprehensive,  and durable settlement of the Middle  East conflict 
through  the  conclusion of  peace  treaties bafied  on  Security Council resolu-
~lons  242  and  JJ8  in all their  parts.  Their  purpose  is to achieve  peace 
and  good  neighbourly relations.  They  recognise  that,  for  peace  to endure, 
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it !11Ust  Jn"Jolve all  those  who  have heen  most deeply affected by the conflict. 
'!'hey  therefore  agree  that  this  framework  as  appropriate  is  intended by  them 
to constitute>  a  basis  for  peace not  only between  Egypt  and  Israel, but also 
between  Israel and  each  of its other neighbours  which  is prepared to nego-
tiate peace  with Israel on  this basis.  With  that objective in mind,  they 
have  agreed  to proceed  as  follows: 
A.  West  9ank  and  Gnza 
1.  ~gypt,  Isra~l. Jordan  and  the  representatives  of~  Palestinian 
~  3!10uld  pa~:ticipate in negotiations  on  the  resolution of the 
Palestinian  problem  in all its aspects.  To  achieve  that objective,  nego-
tiations  relating to the West  Bank  and  Gaza  should  proceed in· three stages: 
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orderly  tranafer of authority,  and  taking  into account  the aeourity con-
cern•  of all the  partiea,  there  ehould he  ~ranaitional arrangement•  for 
~he Wet!t;  !'lank  lllnd  QlliiFI  fnr  ill  peri.Qg  not  ellli'lie!Un\j  fiVfl  Vllafll,  ill Pr<ler  t!l~ 
provide  1'11ll  iHifi!HOIII)'  tll th"  ir~habhlltiU,  \lliOI!If  thl!lle  AffilliQ(IIIII!I\t!i  tll;o 
!HaE'ti  militety yOIIE'rtlittP.fll:  ""d  lt.!j  ••lvllhf\ lll'lllllttiMtttilHtlfl wilL  Dill  w.lth•· 
drawn  aA  110on  an  a  self-qovPrnlnq  'IUthotity hu bean  freely elected by  the 
inhabitants  of  these areau  to  ~aplace the existing military government. 
To  negotiate  the details  of a  transitional arrangement,  the  government of 
Jordan will be  invited  to  join  the  negotiations  on  the basis of this  frame-
work.  These  new  arrangements  should give due  consideration both  to the 
principle of self-government by  the  inhabitants of  these  territories  and 
to  the  legitimate security concerns  of  the  parties  involved. 
J\NNI·:X  ') 
!B)  Egypt,  Israel,  and Jordan will agree  on  the modalities  tor establi•h-
ing  the  elnctod self-governing authority in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  The 
delegations  of  Egypt  and Jordan  may  include  Palestinian•  from  the West  Bank 
and  Gaza  or other Palestinians  au  mutually  agreed.  The  partial will nego-
tiate an Agreement which will define  the  powere  and  reaponaibilities of  the 
self-governing authority to  be  exerciaed  in  the West  Bank  and  Gaza.  A 
wi~hdrawal of  Israeli  armed  foroes  will  take  plaoe  and  there will be  a 
ude~Jloyment at  ~he  rem11ininq  !ar<~aH  topes  into speoitifld  llfllllH'ii:V  locll!-
t:.ion~.  •rh~>  II•Jf!'lomen~ will  Al!Hl  i.nollh~lil  ur~R\Iemente  fM'  ;~~uurinu  l.nt.11rnal 
Aflr1  @l'!tl!ffllll  ~l?('lltity  111t'1  pnl•l.lt1  Oftlllf.  A  R~fllfltl  lttt!lll  polio@  fUftlll!  WI U 
bo  utablialuHl,  whi<:!h  may  lndurle JurdAnilln tlit;Uen•.  rn  llddHion,  ll!ruli 
and Jordanian  forces  will  participate in  joint patrola  and  in  the  manning 
of control  posts  to assure  the security of  the  borders. 
(C)  When  tlw  self-governin<J  <~uthority  (llrlministrative  Council)  in  the 
~lest  Bank  and  G.3Za  is established  and  inaugurated,  the  transitional period 
of  five  years will begin.  As  soon  as  possible,  but not  later  than  the 
third  year. after  the beginning of  the  transitional period,  negotiations 
will  take  place  to determine  the  final status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and 
its relationship with its neighbours,  and  to conclude  a  peace Treaty between 
Israel and  Jordan by  the  ~nd of  the  transitional  period.  These  negotiations 
will be  conducted  among  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  and  the elected representatives 
of  the  inhabitants of  the  West  Sank  and  Gaza.  Two  separate but related 
co~~ittees will be  convened,  one  committee consisting of representatives 
of  th~  four  parties which will negotiate  and  agree  on  the  final status of 
the  w~st Bank  and  Gaza,  and  ite  relationuhip with  ita  neighbours,  and  the 
sllc:Ond  cnmmittoo,  con·3iur.inq  of  reprolilent.\tiveq  nf  !Proal  11nd  reprlllontatiVClll 
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of  J•)rd<~n  to  ilt<  joined hy  che  t>Lae!tad  r~pcasenta~iv"a of  tho  inhabitant.a 
llt  ~h"  w.,~t  11Anl<.  "'"i  Clilv<a,  t<.>  n"'ii""-Liltll  tha  P"iwa  'l'r<;~aty  h"twe~;~n  r~raal 
1111tl  J•Jrduu,  t.okin•l  lu\.n  .1e.:mm~  Ch01  i1<,1rF!I'numt  r<>IWhl!d  on  r.h ..  tln111  ~t111:11~ 
of  the  Wegt  Bauk  nnd  Oa~a.  Th~  n~;~~otiatians  nhall  b01  based on  niL  tho 
proviaionn  and  principles  of  UN  Security council  neuolution  242.  Thd 
nugotlations will resolve,  among  other matters,  the  location of  Lhe  boun-
daries  and  the  natur~ of  the  security arrangements.  The  solution  from  the 
negotiationa  must  also  recognise  the  legitimate  rights  of the  Palestine 
people  and  thoir  juat  requiremente.  In  thio  way,  the  Palestinians will 
p11rttrJipatlil  in  the  tl11termination  of  their  own  future  t:hrnuqh, 
(1)  'l'ht~  ni!I<JOtlAt.ianb  11n10nliJ  1\:qyrtt,  l!l[illll,  Jorct~n and  the  upl.'tollilllt:l!ltiveu 
of  thfjj  inh11bitantg  ot  till•  Wli'lt  llonk  11111'1  011r11  to  <~Ql"IHI  nn  thct  fl.n11L  qt11.~uq 
~f  thu  Wout  Bank  nnd  Gnza  and  oth~r outstanding  iuoums  by  tha  end  of  the 
transitional  p~riod. 
Cll  Sub'llittiny  thol.:  Agreememt  to a  vote  by  the  etact:ed  repraaontutivu 
of  the  inhabitants  of  tho  w~st Bank  and  G&~a. 
(.))  Providing  for  th11  ..,).,r.ttl'd  rflpruentative•  of  th'J  inhabit11nta  of  the 
Wewt  Bank  and  Go:~z:11  to docide  how  thay  ah,.ll  govern  themaelves  con11i11tllnt 
with  the  provisions  of their  Agreement. 
(4)  Participating as  stated above  in  the  work  of  the  committee  negotiating 
the  peace  Treaty betwcP.n  Israel and  Jordan. 
2.  All  necu~gary measures  will be  taken  and  provisions  made  to assure  the 
secun.ty or  Israel  and  its neighbour•  during  the  transitional period  and 
beyond.  To  aaniot  in  providing  such  aecurity,  a  atrong  local police  force 
will be  con"titul~d by  the  aelf-gov~rning authority.  It will be  compo•ed 
of  inhabitants  cr"  til<;  Woot  nnnl<  and  1;nz.1.  ·rha  polic"' will  maintnin  con-
tino;ing  liaiaon  on  internal  ac,:urity matters  with  th*  dtlai•Jnnted  Israeli, 
JordRni~n.  ~nd Egyptian  officers. 
).  During  the  transitional period,  representatives  of  Egypt,  Iorael, 
Jordan,  and  the  aelf-governlng  authority will constitute  a  continuing 
c·.,m:>1itt·'"  to de.;:ide  I.Jy  agn:toment  on  tho  modalities  of  .:tdmisaion  of  persons 
displaced  from  th~ West  Bonk  and  Gnza  in  1967,  together with  ncce•sary 
measures  to  prevent disruption  and  diaordar.  Other  matters  of common 
conc.:!rn  may  also be  dealt with  by  this  committee. 
4.  8gypt  and  IRrael will work  with  each  other  and with  other  interested 
parti~s  to establish agreed  procedures  for  a  prompt,  just and  permanent 
implementation  of  the  resolution  of  the  refugee  problem. 
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B.  Egypt-Israel 
1.  Egypt  and  Israel undertake  not  to resort to  the  threat or  the  use  of 
force  to settle disputes.  Any disputes shall be  settled by peaceful means 
in accordance with  the  provisions of Article  33  of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
2.  In  order  to achieve  peace between  them,  the parties agree  to negotiate 
in good  faith with  a  goal of concluding within three months  from  the signing 
of this  framework  a  peace Treaty between  them,  while  inviting the  other 
parties  to  the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude 
similar peace  treaties with a  view to achieving  a  comprehensive peace  in 
the_ area.  The  framework  for  the conclusion of  a  peace  Treaty between  Egypt 
and  Israel will govP.rr.  the  peace negotiations between ·them.  The  parties will 
agree  on  the modalities  and  the  timetable  for  the  implementation of their 
obligations  under  the  Treaty. 
~.  Associated Principles 
1.  Egypt and  Israel state that the  principles  and  provisions described 
below  should apply  to  pe.3ce  treaties between  Israel and  each of its 
neighbours  - Egypt,  Jordan,  Syria  and  Lebanon. 
2.  Signatories shall establish among  themselves  relationships  normal  to 
states at peace with  one  another.  To  this end,  they should undertake to 
abide by all the  provisions  of  the Charter of the United Nations.  Steps 
to be  taken  in this  respect  include: 
(a)  full  recognition: 
(bl  abolishing  economic boycotts: 
Cc)  guaranteeing that under  their jurisdiction the citizens of the 
other parties shall enjoy  the  protection of  the  due  process  of 
law. 
3.  Signatories should explore possibilities  for  economic  development  in 
the context of  final  peace  treaties,  with  the  objective of contributing to 
the  atmospner"  of  peace,  cooperation  and  friendship which  is  their common 
goal. 
4.  Claims  commissions  should be  established for  the mutual  settlement of 
all financial  claims. 
5.  The  united States shall be  invited  to participate in  the  talks  on 
mattecs  related  to  tha  modalities  of  the  implementation of the Agreements 
and  workin~ out  the  timetable  for  the  carrying out of  the  obligations  of 
the  parties. 
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6.  ':'!w  United  N'3tions  Security Council shall be  requested  to endorse  the 
peace  T~"aties and  ensure  that  their  provisions  shall not be  violated. 
'!'IJ<•  permancnl  :nembcrs  of  the  Security Council shall be  requested  to under-
write  the  peace  Treaties  and  ensure  respect  for  their  provisions.  They 
shall also be  requested  to conform their policies  and  actions with  the 
und~rta~ings contained  in  this  framework. 
FPJII·!'Ol-IORK  FOR  THE  CO!JCLUSiot{  OF  A  PEACE  TREIITY  BETWEEc~ EGYPT  AND  ISRAEL 
In  order  to  achieve  peace  between  them,  Israel and  Egypt. agree  to 
negotiate  in  gcod  faith with  a  goal  of concluding within  three  months  of 
the  siqni~q of  this  framework  a  peace  Treaty between  them. 
It is  agreed  that: 
The  site of  the  negotiations will  be  under  a  United  Nations  flag at 
a  location  or  lo~ations to be  mutually agreed  . 
.  ~ll of  the  principles  of  UN  Resolution  242  >~ill apply in  this  resolu-
ticm  of  the  dispute  between  Israel  and  Egypt. 
Unless  otherwise  mutually agreed,  terms  of  the  peace  Treaty will be 
implemented  between  two  and  three  years  after  the  peace  Treaty  is signed. 
The  following  mattecs  are  agreed between  the  parties: 
(a)  The  full  exercise  of  Egyptian  sovereignty up  to  the  internationally 
rP.cognised  border between  Egypt  and  mandated  Palestine; 
(~)  The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces  from  the  Sinai; 
ic)  The  us~ of airfields  left by  the  Israelis  near  El  Arish.  Rafah, 
Ras  En  Naqb,  and  Sharm  El  Sheikh  for  civilian  purposP.s  only, 
ir.clt.:c1ing  possible  commercial  use by all nations; 
(rl)  '!'he  eight of  free  passage  by  ships  of  Israel  through  the  Gulf  of 
Su~z.  and  the  Suez  Canal  on  tl1e  basis  of  the  Constantinople. 
Convention  of  1888  apply>ng  to all nations;  the Strait 'f Tiran 
and  the  Gulf  of  Aqaba  are  international  waterways  to be  open  to 
all  nations  for  unimpGded  and  nonsuspendaLle  freedom  of  naviga-
tion  and  ove~flight; 
(r.)  'f!1e  constructi.cm  of  a  hig!1w.1y  between  the  Sindi  a:nd  Jord1.1n  near 
£\at  ·.rith  guaranteed  free  and  ;>eacc.ful  passage by  Egypt  and  Jordan; 
a:od 
(fl  Th<O  gtation>ng  of  military  forces  listed below. 
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Stationing nf Forces 
A.  N6  m6re  than one division  (mechanised. or infantry)  of  Egyptian  armed 
forc~s will be stationed within an area  lying approximately 50 kilometers 
(Kml  east of the Gulf of Suez and  the Suez Canal. 
B.  Only United Nations  forces  and civil police  equipped with· light 
w~apons to perform normal  police  functions will be stationed within  an 
area lying west of the  international border  and  the  Gulf of Aqaba,  varying 
in width  from  20  Km  to 40  Km. 
c.  In  the area within  three  Km  east of  the  international border  there 
will be  Israeli limited military forces  not to exceed  four  infantry bat-
talions and  United Nations  observere. 
D.  Border  patrol units,  not to exceed  three battalions,  will supplement 
the civii police in  maintain~ng order in the  area  not included above. 
The  exact demarcation of the above  areas will be as  decided during 
the  peace  negotiations. 
Early warning stations  may  exist to ensure compliance with  the  terms 
of  the Agreement. 
United Nations  forces  will be stationed:  (a)  in part of the  area in 
the Sinai  lying within about  20  Km  of the Mediterranean  Sea  and adjacent 
.to the  international border,  and  (bl  in  the  Sharm  El  Sheikh area to ensure 
freedom  of passage  through  the Strait of Tiran;  and  these  forces  will not 
be  r.:!moveJ  unless  such  removal  is  approvP.d  by  the  Security Council of the 
United  Nations  wibh  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  five  permanent members. 
After  a  peace Treaty is signed,  and after the  interim withdrawal  is 
complete.  ~ormal relations will be established between  Egypt  and  Israel, 
including:  full  recognition,  including diplomatic,  economic  and cultural 
relations:  termination  of economic boycotts  and barriers  to  the  free  move-
~eht of goods  and  people:  and mutual  protection of citizens by  the  due  pro-
C!lSS  of  law. 
Interim  t~ithdrawal 
Between  three months  and  nine months  after  the  signing of  the  peace 
Treaty,  al1 Israeli forces  will withdraw east of  a  line extending  from  a 
point east of  El Arish  to  Ras  Muhammad,  the  exact  location  of this line to 
be  determined by mutual  agreement. 
oOo 
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PRINCIPLES  OF  A  PLAN  FOR  PEACE 
IN THE  MIDDLE  EAST 
Proposed  by  H.R.H.  Crown  Prince  FAHD  of Saudi Arabia 
Source:  Interview by  Crown  Prince  FAHD  with  the Saudi  Press Agency, 
7  August  1981 
'There are  a  number  of  principles  on which a  just: sett-lement 
might  be  based,  and  these are  laid down  in the  resolutions  adopted 
and  confirmed  by  the  United  Nations  over  the  last 'few years. 
These  principles are: 
1.  Withdrawal by Israel from all the Arab territories  occupied 
during  the  1967 war,  including the Arab sector of Jerusalem_. 
2.  Removal  of all Israeli settlements  from  the  territory occupied 
in  1967. 
3.  Guaranteed  freedom  of worship for a.ll Islamic religions in the 
Holy  Land  of Palestine. 
4.  Recognition  of  the  ri_ght  of  repatriation of  the  two million 
Palestinian refugees  and  of  the  right  to compensation  f-or  those who 
do  not  wish to return. 
5.  Placing the  West  Ban}<  and  the  Gaza  Strip under  UN  supervision for 
a  transitional  period  of  ~  few  months  only. 
6.  Creation of  an  indep~ndent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its 
capital. 
7.  Recognition  of  the  right  of atl the states  in  the  region to live 
in peace. 
8.  Application of  the  principles  listed above  to be  guaranteed  by  the 
United  Nations  or a  number  of its members.' 
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ANNEX  6A 
The  following  are the  key  points of  the  resolution adopted  unanimously 
at  the  Conference  of  Arab  Heads  of State at  Fez,  8-10 September  1982:-
1.  The  withdrawal  of  Israel  from  all Arab  territories occupied  in 1967 
including  Arab  al  Qods  (Jerusalem), 
2.  The  dismantling  of  settlements established by  Israel on  the Arab.territories 
after 1967, 
3.  The  guarantee of  freedom  of  worship  and  practice of  religious  rites for 
all  religions  in the  holy  shrines, 
4.  The  reaffirmation of  the Palestinian people's  right  to  self-determination 
and  the exercise of  its imprescriptible and  inalienable national  rights 
under  the  leadership of  the Palestine Liberation Organisation  (PLO),  it: 
sole  and  legitimate  representative,  and  the  indemnification of all those·who 
do  not  desire  to  return, 
5.  The  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip to be  placed  under  the  control of  the United 
Nations  for  a  transitory period not  exceeding  a  few  months, 
6.  The  establishment  of  an  independent  Palestinian State with  Al  Qods  as  its 
capital  {Jerusalem), 
7.  The  United  f>lation·s  Security .C9uncil  to guarantee peace  among  all states 
of  the  region  including  the  independent  Palestinian State, 
8.  The  United  Nations  Security Council  to guarantee  that  these principles 
are  respected. 
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outlining the United States'  proposals on Palestine 
.ANNEX  6B 
.••  "The  Lebanon  war,  tragic as it was,  has left us with a  new  opportu-
nity for Middle  East peace.  We  must  seize it now  and bring peace to this 
troubled area so vital to world stability while there is still time.  It 
was  with this strong conviction that over a  month  ago,  before the present 
negotiations in Beirut had been completed,  I  directed Secretary of State 
Shultz  to again  review our policy  and to consult a  wide  range of out-
standing Americans  on  the best ways  to strengthen chances for peace in 
the Middle  East.  We  have consulted with many  of the officials who  were 
historically involved in the process,  with members  of the Congress and with 
individuals from  the private sector.  And  I  have held extensive consultations 
with my  own  advisors on  the principles I  will outline to you  tonight. 
The  evacuation of the PLO  fran Beirut is now  camplete,  and we  can now 
help the Lebanese  to rebuild their war-tom coliD.iry.  We  awe it to ourselves, 
and toposterity, to move  quickly to build upon  this achievement.  A stable 
and revived Lebanon  is essential to all our hopes  for peace in the region. 
The  people of Lebanon  deserve the best  efforts of the international camrunity 
to tum the nightmares of the past several years into a  new  dawn  of hope. 
But the opportilllities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and 
end in Lebanon.  As  we  help Lebanon  rebuild,  we  must also move  to resolve 
the root causes of conflict between Arabs  and  Israelis. 
The  war  in Lebanon  has demonstrated many  things,  but two  consequences 
are key to the peace process. 
First,  the militaDJ losses of the PLO  have  not diminished the yearning 
of the Palestinian people for a  just solution of their claims;  and second, 
while Israel's military successes in Lebanon  have  demonstrated that its 
armed  forces are second to none  in the region,  they alone cannot bring just 
and lasting peace  to Israel and her neighbors. 
The  question  now  is how  to reconcile Israel's legitimate security 
concerns with the  legitimate rights of the Palestinians.  And  that answer 
can only come  at the negotiating table.  Each  party must  recognize that the 
outcome  must  be acceptable to all and that true peace will require compro-
mises by all. 
So,  tonight I  ~  calling for a  fresh start. This is the moment  for all 
those directly concerned to get involved - or lend their support - to a 
workable basis for peace.  The  Camp  David Agreement  remains the foundation 
of our policy.  Its language provides all parties with the lee-way they need 
for successful negotiations. 
I  call on  Israel to make  clear that the security for which  she yearns 
can only be achieved through genuine peace.  A peace requiring magnaminity, 
vision and courage. 
I  call on  the Palestinian people to recognize that their own  political 
aspirations are inextricably bound  to recognition of Israel's right to 
a  secure future. 
And  I  call on the Arab  states to accept the reality of Israel - and 
the reality that peace and  justice are to be gained only  tl~ough hard, 
fair,  direct negotiation. 
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has  a  special responsibility.  No  other nation is in a  position to deal with 
the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability. 
The  time  has come  for a  new  realism on the part of all the peoples of 
the Middle East.  The  state of Israel is an accomplished fact;  it deserves 
unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations.  But Israel's 
legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries,  and has been 
denied by every Arab state except Egypt.  Israel exists; it has a  right to 
exist in peace behind secure and defensable borders,  and it has a  right to 
demand  of its neighbors that they recognize those facts. 
The  war in Lebanon  has demonstrated another reality in the region.  The 
departure of the Palestinians from  Beirut dramatizes more  than ever the 
homelessness  of  the  Palestinian people.  Palestinians feel strongly that 
their cause is more  than a  question of refugees.  I  agree.  The Carup  David . 
Agreement recognized that fact when  it spoke of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people and their just requirements.  For peace to endure, 
it must involve all those who  have been most  deeply affected by the conflict. 
Only through broader participation in the peace process - most  immediately 
by Jordan and by the Palestinians - will Israel be able to rest confident 
in the knowledge  that its security and integrity will be respected by its 
neighbors.  Only through the process of negotiation can all the nations of 
the Middle East achieve a  secure peace. 
These then are our general goals.  What  are the specific new  American 
positions,  and why  are we  taking them? 
In the Camp  David talks thus far,  both Israel and Egypt have felt free 
to express openly their views as to what the outcome  should be.  Understandably, 
their views  have differed on many  points. 
The  United States has thus far sought to play the role of mediator; 
we  have avoided public comment  on  the key issues.  We  have  always  recognized 
- and continue to recognize - that only the voluntary agreement of those 
parties most directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring 
solution.  But it has become  evident to me  that some  clearer sense of 
America's position on  the key issues is necessary to encourage wider 
support for the peace process. 
First,  as outlined in the Camp. David accords,  there must be a  period 
of time during  ~mich the Palestinian inhabitants of the West  Bank  and Gaza 
will have full autonomy  over their own  affairs.  Due  consideration  must 
be  given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the 
territories and to the  legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. 
The  purpose of the  5-year period of transition vmich  would begin 
after free elections for a  self-governing Palestinian authority is to prove 
to the Palestinians that they can run their own  affairs,  and that such 
Palestinian autonomy  poses no threat to Israel's security. 
The  United States will not support the use of any additional  land for 
the purpose of  settlen~nts during the transition period.  Indeed,  the immediate 
adoption of a  settlewent freeze by Israel,  more  than any other action, 
could create the confidence  needed for wider participation in these talks. 
Further settlewent activity is in no  way  necessary for the security of 
Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a  final outcome 
can be freely and fairly negotiated. 
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of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of danestic 
authority from  Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West  Bank  and 
Gaza.  At  the same  time,  such a  transfer must  not interfere with Israel's 
security requirements. 
Beyond the transition period,  as we  look to the future of the West 
Bank and Gaza,  it is clear to me  that peace cannot be achieved by the fonnation 
of an  independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor  is it 
achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over 
the West  Bank and Gaza. 
So  the United States will not support the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state in the West  Bank and Gaza,  and we will not support annexa-
tion or permanent control by Israel. 
There is, however,  another way  to peace.  The final status of these 
lands must,  of course,  be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations. 
But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the 
Palestinians of the West  Bank and Gaza  in association with Jordan offers 
the best chance for a  durable,  just and lasting peace. 
We  base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli 
conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange 
of territory for peace.  This exchange is enshrined in United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 242,  which  is,  in turn,  incorporated in all its 
parts in the camp  David agreements.  U.N.  Resolution 242  remains wholly 
valid as the foundation stone of America's  Middle East peace effort. 
It is the United States' position that - in return for peace - the 
withdrawal provision of Resolution 242  applies to all fronts,  including the 
West  Bank  and Gaza. 
When  the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on 
the extent to which  Israel shoula be  asked to give up  territory will be 
heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the 
security arrangements offered in return. 
Finally,  we  remain convinced that Jerusalem must  remain undivided, 
but its final status should be decided through negotiations. 
In the course of the negotiatons to come,  the United States will 
support positions that seem  to us  fair and reasonable compromises,  and likely 
to pranote a  sound  agreement.  ~ve will also put forward our own  detailed 
proposals when  we  believe they can  be helpful. And,  make  no mistake,  the 
United States will oppose  any proposal - from  any party and at any point 
in the negotiating process - that threatens the security of Israel. America's 
commitment  to the security of Israel is  ironclad,  and  I  might add,  so is mine. 
During  the past few  days,  our ambassadors  in Israel,  Egypt,  Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host governments  the proposals in 
full detail that I  have outlined  here tonight. 
I  am  convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security, 
and bring durability to an  Arab-Israeli peace. 
The  United States will stand by  these principles with total dedication. 
They  are fully consistent with Israel's security requirements and the aspi-
rations of the Palestinians.  We  will work  hard to broaden participation at 
the peace table as envisaged by the Camp  David accords.  And  I  fervently hope 
that the Palestinians and Jordan,  with the support of their Arab  colleagues, 
will accept this opportunity." ... 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
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1980- 1981 
DOCUMENT  1-99/80 /rev. 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
tabled by  Mr  P.  LALOR 
pursuant  to Rule  25  of the  Rules  of Procedure 
on  the  situation in  South  Lebanon 
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r.ngusn t.cmwn The  European Parliament, 
- considering the  decla~ation of the  Nine  on  ~he situation in the 
Lebanon, 
- considering the plight of the Lebanese  peo9le  and  the human  suffering 
caused by the  continued state of war  in th·-'  country, 
- considering the  rcc~nt bombardment  of  !:;:-'.,[:  nnifil t:roo-os  in the village 
of Bar-Shit,  and the holding of hostages at Al-Tiri by the  Haddad  forces, 
- considering the  Paiestinian attac.,.  or~  ~-::..  '.~hbutz Misgar-Am, 
-whereas the  Security Council mandate  to the Unifil  forces,  which has 
been  renewed  four times,  calls for  the  restoration of the authority 
of the Lebanese  Government  and the supervision of the withdrawal of 
external  armed  elements, 
1.  Calls  on  the  Foreign Ministers of the  Nine  ~eetin9 in political 
cooperation to 
(a)  insist nn  an  Israeli withdrawal  from  South  Lebanon, 
(b)  intensify their efforts to restore peacQ  and the  legitimate 
authority of the Lebanese Government: 
2.  Condemns  the  attacks on  the kibbutz at Migar-Am; 
1.  Condemns  the  recent attacks on  Unifil  forces  and  the holding of 
Ir.ish  Unifil  troops  as  hostages  by  the  Haddad  forces; 
4.  Requests  the  President of  the  European  Parliament to submit this 
motion  for  a  resolution to  the  President of the  council of Foreign 
Ministers meeting  in political  cooperation. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1980- 1981 
DOCUMENT  l-:iOl/80 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mrs  CHARZAT,  Mrs  ROUDY,  Mr  SARRE 
and  Mr  LOO 
pursuant to Rule  25  of the  Rules  of Procedure 
on  the  situation in the Middle East 
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- having  regard  to the  fact  that  a "just  and  lasting peace  can' be brought 
about  only  on  the basis of  an  overall  settlement  along  the  lines of 
Security Council  Resolutions  242  and  338, 
- having  regard to the  fact  that  there cannot  be  more  than  one  way  of 
establishing  a  just and  lasting peace  and  that the  Israelo-Egyptian 
peace treaty  in  accordance  with  the  Camp  David  agreements constitutes 
for  its signatories a,first step towards  an  overall  settlement to end 
30  years of hostility and mistrust, 
- having  rcgN·d  to  tlw  f;,>~ct  that the  Europe~an Community  owes it to 
itself to  uph<.~ld  the  L"ic1ht  ol  the State- of  Isr3.:>l  to  live in pcace 
and  sccurit.y within  safe  frontiers  recognized  by  all, 
having reg<trd  to the  fact  that the Palestinians,  like all  peoples~ are 
entitled to  a  homeland within  a  legal  framework  that it will be  for 
the parties to determine  through  negotiation, 
- having  regard  however  to  the  fact  that in its Charter and  in statements 
by  its  leader~ the Palestine Liberation Organization continues to 
assert that its objective is to destroy  the State of  Israel,  the very 
existence of which it refuses  to recognize,  and  to construct not 
alongside but  in its place  a  Palestinian State, 
1.  Recalls that  ti1C  peoples it represents  are  deeply committed to the 
existence  and  security of  Israel  and  to the means  of  attaining its 
security; 
2.  Calls  LOl'  r,•f:p,•ct  oi  Llw  sm·,•re•iqnty,  te-rritorial  integrity and 
ind<"pcnJ,•tw,•  ~,f  e';h'h  St:;~t,•  in  the'  t·cgion  and  its right to live in, 
peace wid!in  s~fe frontiers  recognized  as  part of  a  regional equili-
brium  independent  of  blocs  that  involves  the creation of demilitarized 
zones; 
-'·  1\.cknowle•cl,h'f'  th.<l  ·'  iu>'l  .1nd  t.IF<l inq  P•':l<'<'  will  have  to  take  account 
of  th<"  lc~1it~mat,•  t·i,Jhts  of  the•  PalC'stiniJns; 
4.  Considers  that  the  rights of  the  one  side cannot  be  asserted to the 
detriment  of  the rights of  the other; 
5.  Resolutely  opposes  any  de  facto  recognition  of  the  PLO  so  long  as its 
Charter  ccntinues to proclaim its determination not  to recognize but to 
destroy_the State of  Israel; 
6.  Urges  the HC'ads  of  St1'1tc  cmd  GCl\'ernment  of  thC'  Nine  and  their 
Ministers  for  Foreign Affairs  not  to  impcdc  applic1'1tion  of  the 
Camp  David  Agr,•,•mcnts,  th,•  onl~·  pcace  proccss currently  ef~ective 
in  the Middle  East,  with  ill-timed declarations; 
7.  Instructs its President  to  forward  this resolution  to  the Heads 
Of  State,  governments  and  parliaments of  the  Member  States and 
to  the  Council  and  Commission  of the European  communities. 
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Working Documents 
1980- 1981 
DOCUMENT  1-774/80 
MOTION  FOR  ~ RESOLUTION 
tabled by  Mr  FANTI,.Mr  GALLUZZI  and  Mr  SEGRE 
pursuant  to Rule  25  of the Rules of Procedure 
on  the expulsion of Palestinian mayors 
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Engli~h l!:dition The  European  Parliament 
concerned at the repeated attempts by the Israeli Government  to 
maintain  a  m~litary presence in the occupied territories in 
contempt of the  UN  resolutions, 
Whereas this occupation  forms  a aerious o~stacle to any attempts 
to find a .political solution to the conflict, 
Having  regard to the  repeated.measu~es to confiscate land on the 
West  Bank, 
1.  Expresses its strong protest at the expulsion of the mayors of 
Hebron  and Halhul: 
2.  Requests the Council of the  ~uropean Community  to take measures 
to  pu~ an  end to all persecution of the legitimate representatives 
• • 
of the inhabitants: 
3.  Requests the council to take positive action to develop the 
initiatives it has  several times announced  for  creatlng the 
necessary conditions for a peaceful  solution to the conflict 
in the Middle  East: 
4.  Instructs its President to  forward  this resolution to the council 
of the  European  Community. 
-66- PE  73.166/fin. /Ann.  9 Lnjo!lish  hlltion 
ANNEX- 10 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1980- 1981 
DOCUMENT  I-819/80 
MOTION  FOR  A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr  d 10RMESSON,  Mr  ALBER,  Mr  PEDINI, 
'  Mr  PFLIMLIN,  Mr  FISCHBACH,  Lady  ELLES,  Mrs  FOURCADE, 
Mrs  MOREAU,  Mr  GALLAND,  Mr  BEYER  de  RYKE,  Mr  DOUBLET, 
Mr  TURCAT,  Mr  FERGUSSON· 
pursuant to Rule  25  of the  Rules  of Procedure 
on  Lebanon 
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convinced  that the restoration of a  lasting peace  in the  Middle 
East requires  the establishment of diplomatic and political relations 
which will guarantee  to each of the  states of the  region respect 
for its territorial integrity and recognition of its right to live 
within secure  and recognized borders, 
Anxious  to make  its contribution to a  solution of the  problem 
of Lebanon,  which currently is one  of the principal centres of tension 
likely to inflame  the whole  region, 
Endorsing  the resolution adopted by  the European  Council  on  2  December 
1980 which reaffirms that one  of the  objectives of the Nine's action 
for  peace in  the  Middle  East is to restore Lebanon within the integrity 
of its borders and  to the  full exercise of its national sovereignty, 
- Underlining its solidarity and  attachment  to the  Lebanese  people whose 
tradition of tolerance  and openness  has  allowed the  harmonious  co-
existence of cultures and religions within one  national community,  and 
anxious  to see  the individuality of this  people protected against attempts 
at destabilisation and domination perpetrated on  Lebanese  territory by 
foreign  powers, 
Wishing  to give its expression of solidarity an institutional form, 
1.  calls for  tl1e  early creation of an  EEC-Mashrek  parliamentary delegation 
along  the  line of the  already operational  EEC-MA  HREB  delegation: 
2.  Asks  that a  special relationship be established within  this delegation 
to enable  Lebanon  to be  represented in complete  independence  of 
neighbouring states and  revolutionary movements  receiving outside 
support and  ·ctive on  Lebanese  territory; 
3.  Instructs its President to determine with  the  Bureau of the  European 
Parliament  the  means  of implementing  this resolution under conditions 
which  respect  the  rights  of the  Lebanese  people. 
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DOCUMENT  1-583/81 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr de  1a  MALENE,  Mr  ANSQUER,  Mr  CLEMENT, 
Mr  COUSTE,  Mr  CRONIN,  Mr  DAVERN,  Mr  DELEAU,  Mr  DENIAU, 
Mrs  EWING,  Mr  FANTON,  Mr  FLANAGAN,  Mr  GERONIMI, 
Mr  ISRAEL,  Mr  JUNOT,  Mr  LALOR,  Mr  de  LIPKOWSKI, 
Mr  MEO,  Mr  NYBORG,  Mr  REMILLY,  Miss De  VALERA, 
Mr  VIE  and Mrs  WEISS 
on behalf of  the Group of European  Progressive 
Democrats 
with request for  topical and  urgent debate pursuant 
to Rule  48  of  the Rules  of Procedure 
on  the  death of President Anwar  el  sadat 
-69- PE  73.166/fin/  Ann.  11 The  European  Parliament, 
dismayed by  the  traqic death of President Anwar  Sadat, 
recoqnizing  the  immense  contribution made  by President Sadat 
to peace in the Middle Eaat and  in the world, 
regretting that his efforts did not meet with a  wider response, 
1.  Affirms  the need  to continue the work  for peace undertaken by 
President Sadat: 
2.  Calls on  all the relevant Community  bodies  to  take action so 
as  to advance  the peace process in the Middle East; 
3.  Instructs its President to forward  this resolution to the Council 
and Commission  of  the European Communities  and  to  the foreign 
ministers meeting in political cooperation. 
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DOCUMENT  l-59G/81 
MI)TJON  fOR  A  RESOLUTION 
tabled by  Mr  FANTI,  Mr  SEGRE,  Mr  GALLUZZI, 
Mrs  Bi\DUEL  GLORIOSO,  Mr  ~AROSSINO,  Mr  FERRERO, 
' 
JIITJ:  i~CJN/\CCTNL,  Hr  SPINEL1JI,  Mr  PAPAIETRO,  fvlr  LEONAlUii, 
Ml  GOU'TrJJEH,  l>lr  DE  PASQUALE,  Mrs  CINCIARI  RODANO, 
IV!r  ":EHl\'/OLU,  Mrs  BARBARELLA,  Mrs  CARRETONI  ROMAGNOLI, 
M.-cs  SOUARCIALUPI,  Mr  CARDIA,  Mr  IPPOLITO,  Mr  VERONESI 
anl1  Mr  VITl\LE 
wi t11  recruest  fo::  topical  and  urgent  debate 
pursuant  to  Rule  48  of  the Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the  SITUATION  IN  THE  MIDDLE  EAST 
- 71  - P E  73. 166 If  in. I Ann.  1 2 .'!:he  European  Parliament;, 
- deeply  shocked by the  &!UllU!l!lination  of President Anwar  Sadat, 
aware of the growing  and very serious threat to the situation  in the 
Middla  East  and  the Mediterranean, 
1.  Strongly condemns  the assassination: 
2.  considers it urgent effectively to take the political and diplomatic 
steps  envisaged by the European Council  in Venice  for  the achievement 
cf a  general  peace  in the Middle East on  the basis of the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all the states of that region,  including 
Israel,  and  the reassertion of the right of the  Palestinian  peof.l.e  to 
their own  independent state: 
3.  Requests  the  President of the Council  to report to it in  the  near  future 
on  the  measures  it has  taken: 
4,  Instructs  its President to  forward  this resolution  to the Council,  the 
Commission  and the governments of the Member  States. 
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DOCUMENT  l-601/81 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
tabled by  Mr  van  AERSSEN,  Mr  BLU~£NFELD,  Mr  KLEPSCH, 
Mrs  CASSANMAGNAGO  CERRETTI,  Mr  VERGEER,  Mr  ALBER, 
Mr  AIGNER,  Mr  BARBI,  Mr  BEUMER,  Mr  BERSANI, 
Mr  von  BISMARCK,  Mr  BOCKLET,  Mrs  BOOT,  Mr  BROK, 
Mr  CLINTON,  Mr  CROUX,  Mr  DALSASS,  ~tr  DE  KEERSMAEKER, 
Mr  DESCr~PS,  Mr  ESTGEN,  Mr  FISCHBACH,  Mr  FRANZ, 
Mr  Ingo  FRIEDRICH,  Mr  FRUH,  Mr  FUCHS,  ~tr  GHERGO,. 
Mr  GIU~ARRA,  I~  HE~AN, Mr  HABSBURG,  Mr  von  HASSEL, 
Mr  HAHN,  Mr  HELMS,  Hr  Karl-Heinz  HOFFMANN, 
Mr  JANSSEN  van  RAAY,  Ivtr  JONKER,  Mr  KATZER,  Mr  LEI'-'lMEP, 
Nrs  LENTZ-CORNETTE,Mr  LIGIOS,  Mr  LUCKER,  Mr  LUS'l'CR, 
Mr  MACJ\!UO,  Mrs  MAIJ-WEGGEN,  Mr  MAJONICA, 
Mr  M.A.LANGRE,  Mr  MERTENS,  Mr  MICHEL,  Mr  MULLER-'" 
Mr  NOTENBOOM,  Mr  d 'ORMESSON,  Mr  PEDINI,  Mr  l:'EN 1 '" 
Mr  POTTERING,  Mrs  RABBETHGE,  Mr  RYAN,  Mr  RJNSCHl~, 
Mr  SCHALL,  Mr  SASSANO 1  Mr  Sl  MONNET,  Mrs  SCHLEIClll:>  , 
Mr  SC!!Nl'l'KER,  Mr  Konrad  SCriON,  Mr  SE1 TLINGEH, 
Mr  TOLMAN,  Mr  TRAVAGLINI 1  Mr  WAWRZIK,  Mr  WEDEf<P11;, 
Mr  von  WOGJ\U  and  Mrs  WALZ 
on behalf of  the  Group of  the  European  People's 
Party 
pursuant  to  Rule  47  of  the  Hules  of  Procedure 
on  the  s tabil  i za Lion  a11d  ext  ens jon  of  peace  effor' · 
in  the  Middle East 
- 73  - PE  73.166/fin  ..  /Ann.  13 ·rhe  European  P<::r.l i amen t 
- aw~re of its responsibility  for  peace  in  the world, 
mindful  of  the efforts beiny  made  to  achieve  peace  in  the  Mjddle East, 
inspired by  the  successful visit  to the  European  Parli~menl by  the winner 
of the  Nobel  peace  price,  President Anwar  F.l  Sadat of Egypt, 
r.calls on  the  Cl'Uncil  and  the  Commission: 
1.  To  ensure  that  the  European  Community  plays  an  active part in the stabiliza-
tion and extension of  the  peace efforts of  the Egyptian,  Israeli and 
American  Governments  and  to  implement  to this effect  the 12-point  programme 
set out.  below; 
2.  To  make  the Egyptian-Israeli peace  treaty an  integral  part  of  a  new 
European  community  policy  for  the Mc,dHerranenn; 
3.  To  undertake  intensive polica! efforts  to bring olhl•r  l\n1b states  into 
this  peace offensive and its intensification; 
4.  To  lay,  by  means  of additional  protocols  to  the agreements with  the 
Maghreb,  the  Mashrek  and  Israel,  the foundations  for  close regio.nal 
cooperdtion  on  the  lines of the  Lome  Convention; 
r,.  'l'o  L.1kl'  leq i.slal ive and  administrative measures  as  a  decisive  means  of 
combiltinq  the  economic  boycott practised by  the Arab  League  against  firms 
in  t1le  European  ~ommunity which  trade with  the countries  involved  in  the 
peace  effort  and  the constantly recurring attempts  by  the Arab  I,eague  to 
extend  this boycott; 
6.  •ro  pursue  ucconUngly efforts  to  extend  comprehensive  financi«l,  economic, 
technical  and  scientific cooperation  as  a  way  of buttressing ~e pedce 
efforts; 
7.  To  set  in  t~:a in  a  process of concerted act  i.on  based  on  economic,  financial 
and  investment-incentive meilsures  in  the  form  of  projects between  Egypt, 
Israel  ann  Lhr:  European  Community  involving all  tlJe  organs  of  the  community; 
8.  'l'o  make  provision  for  ·•  contribution  to  the·  dPvclopment  and  extension of 
a  modern  t:nilwny  1 ine between  Cairo  and  Jerus•'llem  w1 th  connections  to Jordan 
and  Lebanon; 
9.  To  provide  assistance  in  the  tapping of water  resources  and  the exploilation 
of crude oil  and  mineral  deposits  in  the Sinai; 
- 74  - PE  73.166/fin./Ann.  13 10.  To  provide  technological  and  financial  assistance in  the building of 
power  stations to serve the needs of Egypt,  Israel  and other areas of 
the Middle East: 
11.  To  furnish  development  aid for  the canalization of  the  l~iver Jordan  and 
the exploitation of phosphate deposits  in Jordan by participation  jn 
projects; 
12.  To  consider carefully,  in the light of their implications as  regards 
joint European res.ponsibility,  the  applications made  by the countries 
in this region  to Menwer  States for  arms  supplies  and  to ensure that 
proportionality is observed  in  accordance with  the principles of defence, 
detente  and  stabili.t:y; 
u. Instructs its  President to  forward this resolution to  the Council  and 
commission of the European Communities. 
- 75  - PE  73.166/fin./Ann.  13 E x  p  1  a  n  a  t  o  r  y  s  t  a  t  e  m e  n  t 
Hitherto,  Europe's political approach to the  Middle East has  remained 
reserved  and cautious.  The  European Community has  done  no  more  than act 
as  an observer  in the solution of the Middle East conflict.  At no  time 
has  the  involvement of the European Community  in the Middle East peace 
efforts been commensurate with the scale and  importance of its interests 
. in the region.  Europe's dangerously vulnerable southern flank with the 
constant threat of new  conflicts and the possibility of global escalation 
and  the danger of the oil weapon being used again,  with all that that 
implies  for  the economy  and employment  in the Europeap Community,  has 
been  the subject of no  more  than joint statements.  Among  the countries 
of the Western Alliance,  the arduous taek of actively seeking  a  compre-
hensive solution for the Middle Baat conflict has been entrusted and left 
entirely to the United States.  The  European community has  taken hardly 
any active practical measures  to further·this quest. 
Following the camp  David Agreement  and  the Washington  Treaty,  it is high 
time  that the European Community  campaigned actively for  peace  in the 
Middle East,  which  is a  region of such  obvious political,  strategic and 
economic  importance  for Europe.  This is the purpose of this 12-point 
programme. 
The  murder of  President Sadat  shows  that such  action is now  needed  more 
than  ever hefore. 
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ANNEX  14 
UOTION  FOR  A RESOLUTION 
tabled  by  l·ir  !<YRI<OS 
pursuant  to Rule  47  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the annexation  of  territory in the  Golan 
region approved  by  Israel's Knesset 
~he  Eu~.~ean Parliament. 
- having  regard  t(J  the  decisi.on  by  Israel's Knesset  to  annex  ter;:itory  in 
the  Golan  lieight.s,  which constitutes  a·  high-banded action,  reveals 
clearly expansionistic tendencies  and threatens to lead to a  new  armed 
confrontation  in the region, 
- having  regard to the  justifiably sharp reactions  on  the part of Syria, 
Egypt  and the other Arab  countries,  as also by  the  PLO,  which  have 
been  provoked  by  this action, 
confirming  the  declaration made  inVenice  by  the  Member  States of 
the  European  Communities, 
1.  Calls on  Israel's Knesset  to  revoke  its  decision~ 
2.  Calls  on  the  Community  Member  States participating  in the  peace-
keeping  forces  in  the  Sinai  to cancel  their participation  should 
Israel fail to revoke  its decision; 
3.  Calls  upon  the  Council  of  Foreign rHnisters  meeting  in political 
cooperation  to  take  an  immediate  initiative consisting of strict 
measures  in  accordance  with  the  decisions  taken at Venice  in  an 
effort to achieve  a  peaceful outcome  to the continaully deteriorating 
crisis  in  the  Middle  East. 
- 77  - PE  73.166/fin./Ann.  14 Doc.  1-902/81  ANNEX  15 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
t.abled  by  Mr  EPHREMIDIS,  Mr  ADAr10U  and  Mr  ALAVANOS 
pursuant to Rule  47  of  ~he, Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the  annexation. of the  Golan  Heights  by  Israel 
having  regard  lo  the  f,tct  thal  the  Government  of  israel  has  dPr:ideu 
~o annex  the  Golan  Heights,  a  region  which  under  international treaties 
belongs  to Syria  and  which  is forcibly occupied today  by  Israel, 
- whereas  this expansionistic action on  the part of  Israel is contrary 
to Resolutions  No.  242  and  NO•  338  of  the  United  Nations  and  to th0 
fundamental  principles of· International  Law, 
- whereas  this action is a  serious  threat to peace  in the  Middle  East 
and  the entire world,  especially at  the  present time of  international 
tension,  and  represents  a  provocation  to all the  Arab countries, 
1.  Severely condemns  this  inadmissible  and  dangerous  action on  the 
part of  the  Israeli Government; 
2.  Declaras  its full  solidarity with  Syria and all  the other  Arab 
countries; 
3.  Calls  on  the  governments  of  the  Member  States to take  all  suitable 
steps at  international  level to have  this action  by  Israel  cond~mned' 
and  revoked; 
4.  Instruc·ts  its President to  forward  this ;:esolution to the  Council, 
the  governments  of  the  Member  States,  the  governments  of  Israel 
and  Syria  and  the  UN  Security Council. 
PE  73.166/ fin. /Ann.15 
- 78  -DOCUMENT  1-906/81 
MOTION  FOH  A  nESOLUTION 
tabled  by  Mr  SEG~E and  Mr  CARDIA 
ANNEX  16 
pursuant to Rule  47  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the  annexation of  the  Golan  Heights  by  the  State of  Israel 
The  European  Parliament, 
- whereas  the  continued military occupation  by  Israel of Arab territories 
constitutes  a  serious threat to peace  in the  Middle  East and the 
Aediterranean, 
- whereas  the position of  Israel is not  only  illegitimate and contrary 
to international  law  but  also represents the  most  serious obstacle 
to a  just and  lasting solution to the  problems of  the  Middle  East, 
1.  Condemns  Israel's decision,  following  it!:!  annexation  of  the  eas:.:.ern  part 
of  Jerusalem,  to annex  th"  Syrinn  tcrritoricfl of  the  Golan  lleightlil, 
thereby  provoking  vigorous  reactions  from  many  quarters around  the 
world; 
2.  nequests.Israel  to end  its occupation  of  the  Arab  territorieH  by 
withdrawing,  in  applicatJon  in  UN  Resolutions  Nos.  242  and  338, 
to within  the  frontiers  fixed prior to the  war  of  June  1967; 
3.  Calls  upon  the  Commission  and  the  Council  of  the  Ten  to undertake 
a  new  and  more  vigorous political and  diplomatic  initiative,  on 
the  basis  of  the  Venice  declaration,  wi.th  the  aim  of  promoting peace 
and  cooperation  among  the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East  and  securing 
recognition  of  the Palestinian people's right to self-determination 
and  to  have  a  state of their own,  while  respecting  the  autonomy 
and  security of all States,  including  Israel; 
4.  !ns~ructs its  ~resident to  forwa~d this  resolution  to the  Council, 
~he Commission  and  the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  meeting  in political 
cooperation. 
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MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
t.Jbled  by  Mr  MARSHALL,  r1:t:  1WRMAN'ION,  Mr  HORD, 
Mr  JOHNSON,  Mr  KELLETT-BOWM~~  Mr  TYRRELL, 
Mr  TUC1U·IAN,  i'-lr  l~R.i-1 £L,  Mr  PRAG  "-':r  SELIGMAN, 
Mrs  EWING 
pursuant  to Rule  47  of  the  Rules  of Procedure 
Qn  the  Israeli  a7lne:~c.:.ic'!1  of  the  G-:>lan 
- 80  -
Pf.73.166tfin./Ann.17 The  European Parliament, 
-deploring Syria's failure  torecognize Israel's right to existence; 
- remembering  how  the Syrians used the Golan to shell Israeli settle-
ments  in Israel, 
- supporting the Venice Declaration's commitment to Israel's right to 
secure f.rontiers, 
remembering -Syria's attack on  Israel in 1973  which  was  defeated only 
because Israel occupied the Golan Heights, 
deploring Syria's bitter hostility to the Camp  David process which 
offers the  key to peace  in  the Middle  East, 
L  Believes that  Israeli occupation of the Golan is an essential guarantee 
of Israel's freedom; 
2.  Condemns  those enemies  and critics of Israel's recent annexation of 
the Golan  who  have  ignored Israel's right to exist; 
Syria's blatant. aggression towards  Israel and the vital importance 
of the Golan  Heights to Israel's security. 
/ 
3.  Instructs its President to forward  this resolution to the Commission, 
the council,  the  foreign ministers meeting in political cooperation. 
and  the Israeli government. 
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Lnglish Edition 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
tabled by  Mr  KYRKOS 
pursuant  to  Rule  47  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the  occupied  Arab  territories  on  the 
West  Bank  and  in  the  Gaza  Strip 
- 82  - PE  73.166/fin,/Ann.18 The  European  Parliament, 
- concerned at  the  pressures  bnirig exerted by  the  Israeli Government 
of the  occupied Arab  territories on  the West  Bank  and  in the  Gaza Strip, 
which  has  led to the resignation of the  people's elected leaders; 
appalled at  the blatant terrorist methods  emfloyed  by  the  occupying 
Israeli authorities,  which  r.~sulted in the  mt rder of unarmed 
Palestinians,  including children  7  and  16  yecrs old,  who  were 
protesting peacefully; 
- whereas  the  Israeli Government  is employing  these  methods  with  a 
view to annexing  the  occupied  territories,  disregarding the  unwritten 
rights of  the Palestinian people,  the  UN  resclutions and general 
world opinion; 
1.  Condemns  the terrorist methods  and  the  policy of  annexing 
Palestinian territories pursued  by  the  Israeli Government  as 
a  contravention of all the principles of  int~rnational law; 
2.  Calls  for  the  immediate  punishment of the perpetrators of  these 
crimes,  no  matter  what  position they  hold; 
3.  Calls  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of Israeli  forces  from  the 
occupied Arab  territories,  the  implementation of  the  UN  resolutions 
and,  in particular,  the  recognition of  the Palestinian people's 
right to self-determination  and  to create its own  independent 
state in  its ancestral territory; 
4.  Calls  upon  the  governments  of  the  Member  States of  the  Community 
immediately  to  recognize  the  PLO  as  the.•  sole  legal  reprPscnt ativc 
of the Palestinian  people  in  response  to  the  Is  rae  1 i  Govcrnmcut' !; 
policy and  as  a  first step  in  a  broad  European  initiative aimed  <~t 
finding  a  complete  and  just solution to the  Middle  East  problem, 
.with·a view  to ensuring  the  security and  peace  for  all  the States 
in  the  region,  including Israel; 
5.  Resolves  to organize  a  day  of  solidarity with  the Palestinians, 
who  are  fighting  for  their unwritten  rights. 
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DOCUMENT  l-333/82 
MOTION  FOR  A RESOLUTION 
TABLED  BY  Mr  ROMUALDI,  Mr  ALMIRANTE,  Mr  BUTTAFUOCO 
and  Mr  PETRONIO 
pursuant to Rule  47  of  the  Rules  of Procedure 
on  the  Israeli  invasion of  Southern Lebanon 
- 84  - PE  73.166lf.i n ./Ann.  19 THE  EUROPEAN  ;?ARI.JI/\f/iENT 
A)  stressing  the  extreme  g~av 
in  Southern  Lebanon  as  a  resul~ of  h2  !s~a21. 
B)  noting  that  there  J~s  no  polj_·t:.~l  __  c.~~.J  ;;t.rr~  i:~t_1f'l;::  in  Leban.ora.  ~.:!h5.ch  would 
allow  the  country to  take  action  itself to  combat  the  ~ontinued 
outrages  comm.i·t'ced  by  ti1e  Vf;.xious  pcl.;xa.te  n:c  foreign  c:nn:i.es  which 
have  chosen  this  unfo:rtuna:te  conr,t.x 
C)  pointing out  that it may  be  difficuJt  co 
these  developments  and  ths  c.8n 
invasion or  the  complex  military  2nd  pol 
Middle  East  as  a  whole  and  in 
which  is already  the  theatre  fer  t  e  w?r 
and  the  Red  Sea, 
at  the  Venice  summit, 
E)  having  regard  to  the  initia 
in-Office  of  the  Council  o 
F)  having  regard  to the  UN  resolution 
State of  Israel 
G)  having  regard  to  the  need  for 
H)  having  regard  to  the  agreeme  ts  s  q 
States,  Egypt  and  Israel, 
I)  having  regard to  the  presence  of 
1  1:  •l".  ;n:' 
L  h:-::  5.rnpact  of 
l  st  I srael  ]_ 
l  situation  in the 
the Persian Gulf, 
an  Commu11ity 
n  Con:mn.m it:y, 
n c  in  C-!outhern 
Lebanon  and  the  peace- ing  forces  of  he  US  foux  Community 
countries  in  Sinai, 
l)  Calls  for  an  immediate  end  to  host 
,  .  .,  r~ 
(.1 :J 2)  Calls  on  Israel ~o withdraw its troops behind its former  fron-
tiers; 
3}  Calls on  the Council  and the Commission  to take all the  necessary 
political and diplomatic  steps to ensure that Lebanon,  a  defehce-
less country which is being torn apart by  violence and terrorism 
and is thus  even  less able  to withstand the aggression  and  tragic 
reprisals  by  Israel,  does  not disintegrate as  a  result of conflicts 
between certain factions  which clearly do  not reflect the wishes 
of its people; 
4)  Calls for  specific measures  to create a  Palestinian State· as  ad-
vocated by all the Mediterranean countries;  this will certainly 
not be facilitated by the activities of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization,  whose  direct or indirect responsibility for  the 
terrorist activities which  have  disrupted the Middle  East  and the 
daily life of the entire western world cannot easily be  refuted; 
5)  Instructs its President to  forward this motion  for  a  resolution 
to the Council  and  the  Commission. 
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DOCUMENT'l'-"S9/82 
MOTION  FOR  A·RESOLUTION 
;  ..  ,)  ~'  . ~  ' 
tabled by Mr  GLINNE,  Mr  ALBERS,  Mr  BOYES, 
Mr  GAUTIER,  Mr  NIKOLAOU,  Mr  RIEGER,  ~  ROGALLA,  , · 
Mr  ROGERS,  Mr  SCHINZEL,  Mr  SCHMID,  Mrs  WEBER 
and Mrs  WIECZOREK-ZEUL 
for entry in the register 
pursuant to Rule  49  of the Rules  of Procedure 
")  ...  '  ...  ~ 
on  the  imposition of martial  law  in :the-,ter:r:·itories 
occupied by Israel 
- 87  - PE  73. 1661 f i r'\I'.Ann. 20 The  European Parliament, 
- concerned for peace  in the Middle  East, 
- dismayed at the imposition of martial  law in the  Israeli-occupied 
areas of the West  Bank  and the Gaza Strip, 
-dismayed at the-shooting of Palestinian demonstrators  by  the Israeli 
military, 
- dismayed at the arrest and dismissal  from  office of the Palestinian 
1tayors of Nablus  and Ramallah, 
1.  Condemns  the policy of the Israeli government ·in  the,·occupied 
areas1 
2.  Calls for  an  end to the use  of  firearms  against  unarmed 
demonstrators; 
3.  Calls for  the reinstatement of the mayors  of Nablus  and Ramallah; 
4.  Looks  to the government  of  Israel to respect  human  rights; 
5.  Notes that the  European  Community  attaches great  importance  to 
respect for  human  rights in the matter of its trade relations 
and financial aids; 
6.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the 
Commission,  the Council  and the  Israeli government. 
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